The Price of Corruption by Rodrigues, Usha
Digital Commons @ Georgia Law
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship
7-1-2015
The Price of Corruption
Usha Rodrigues
University of Georgia School of Law, rodrig@uga.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access
For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.
Repository Citation
Usha Rodrigues, The Price of Corruption , 31 J. L. & Pol. 45 (2015),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/1033
The Price of Corruption
Usha R. Rodrigues*
According to the Supreme Court, politicians can't be bought for less than
$5200, the maximum campaign contribution an individual can give a single
legislator. Consequently the Court struck down aggregate contribution
limits on the theory that confining individual donations to that base limit
provides an adequate safeguard against corruption.
But the Court was wrong. Coupling data from actual campaign
contributions from the last election cycle with social science research, this
Article demonstrates that corruption likely occurs below the base limit
threshold. In one case, a CEO made afirst-time $1000 donation to a member
of Congress. The next day that representative introduced a securities bill
tailored to the interests of that CEO's firm. The fact that the price of
corruption is lower than commonly understood has fundamental
repercussions for the Court's current protection of money as speech.
* M.E. Kilpatrick Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. I thank participants at
workshops Fordham Law School and Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research at Wharton. Stephen
M. Bainbridge, Kent Barnett, William Baude, Vincent Blasi, Nathan Chapman, Dan T. Coenen, Jill
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Peter "Bo" Rutledge, and Yesha Yadav. Mistakes are my own.
Journal of Law & Politics
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 47
I. THE STORY OF SECTION 12(G) 51
A. On the Hill 53
B. Lobbying and Campaign Contributions 56
II. DO THE SECONDMARKET EMPLOYEE DONATIONS QUALIFY AS
CORRUPT UNDER MCCUTCHEON? 63
A. Corruption Means quid pro quo Corruption, and Direct
Campaign Contributions are Especially Dangerous 64
B. Bribery Distinguished 66
C. Corruption Requires Neither a Bad Policy Outcome nor
Causation 69
D. The "Appearance of Corruption" is Enough 72
E. The Reciprocity Principle and the Power of Small Gifts 76
III. THE BASE LIMITS ARE A COMPROMISE, NOT A SAFE HARBOR 78
A. If "Gratitude and Access " Are Not Corruption, Then the Base
Limits Demarcate What Will Always be a Fuzzy Line 79
B. McCutcheon's Impoverished View of the Base Limits 82
C. In Reality, the Base Limits Are no Safe Harbor-Especially in
Areas ofLow Salience 86
D. The Wobbly-Fulcrum Problem 88
IV. FURTHER LESSONS 90
A. A Missed Argumentfor Aggregate Limits 90
B. The Importance of the Base Limits 91
C. Limits on Corporate Donations 92
D. An Alternative to the "Clientelist" Corruption Model 93
E. Thoughts on Representativeness and Empirics 94
F. Disclosure's Limits 95
APPENDIX 96
[Vol.XXXI:45
Mispricing Corruption
INTRODUCTION
In McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, Chief Justice Roberts
made a crucial assumption: a $5200 contribution is not enough to create a
"cognizable risk" of corruption.I Drawing upon a combination of social
science research, evidence from the world of lobbying, and a look at
particular contributions from the most recent election cycle, this Article will
demonstrate that donations under $5200 could in fact qualify as corrupt.
Even a paltry $1000 may suffice.2
Federal election law puts a "base limit" on the amount of money a donor
can contribute to a single candidate to $2600 ($5200 in total combining the
primary and general election) and, pre-McCutcheon, also imposed an
"aggregate limit" of $48,600 on the amount a donor could contribute in a
single election cycle.3 The McCutcheon plurality emphasized that the
aggregate limits, in combination with the base limits, layered prophylaxis
upon prophylaxis in a manner that unnecessarily burdened donors' efforts to
use money to voice their preferences for particular candidates.4 In the eyes
of the plurality, this problem was particularly acute because "few if any
contributions to candidates will involve quidpro quo arrangements" in the
first place.5 Using this reasoning, it struck down the aggregate limits as an
unconstitutional restraint on donors' free-speech interests in contributing
money to the candidates of their choice.
Thus, the effectiveness of the base limits as protection against corruption
is central to the balance Justice Roberts strikes between money-as-speech
and the prevention of corruption. He presumes that no "cognizable risk of
corruption" exists below the base limits.6 Yet in a political environment
where even a $1000 donation appears to prompt legislation, aggregate limits
are meaningful because they limit the number of instances an individual
donor can engage in quid pro quo corruption. Far from being belt and
suspenders, the aggregate limits become a tool to mitigate corrupting
influences that may persist within the base limits. Rightly understood, then,
the base limits are a rough compromise struck precisely because it is so hard
to identify what constitutes corruption. Yet leading election law scholar
McCutchcon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1439 (2014).
2 See infra p. 6.
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1442.
Id. at 1458.
Id. at 1458 (quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
6 See id. at 1439.
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Richard Hasen has suggested that the base limits themselves are vulnerable
to constitutional attack.7
Original research implicates SecondMarket, a new trading platform that
provided a market for the secondary trading of the shares of privately held
corporations.8 The law SecondMarket acutely focused on was Section 12(g)
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which prior to the 2012
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (the "JOBS Act") required firms with
over 499 shareholders to make public disclosures to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the "500-shareholder rule"), thus effectively
coercing them to go public.9 Part I of this Article recounts in detail the
problems that Section 12(g) posed for SecondMarket, but the critical point
is that it was vital to the firm's business model that the law be changed.1"
SecondMarket sought that change. Two episodes in this reform effort
stand out. First, on May 24, 2011, Representative Jim Himes (D-CT), a
member of the Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government
Sponsored Enterprises, introduced H.R. 1965, requesting a study of
appropriate shareholder registration thresholds.1" Within two weeks, two
SecondMarket employees-its CEO and its head of public affairs-each
donated $1000 to Representative Himes. I2
'See Richard L. Hasen, Die Another Day: The Supreme Court Takes a Big Step Closer to Gutting the
Last Bits of Campaign Finances Reform, SLATE (Apr. 2, 2014, 1:13 PM), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news andjolitics/jurisprudence/2014/04/the subtle awfulness of the mccutche
on v fee campaign financedecision thc.html ("While Roberts goes out of his way to say that those base
limits were not challenged today, he does not do anything to affirm that those limits are safe. In fact, he
expressly says those limits don't prevent corruption, but are "prophylaxis"-and that itself could provide a
basis for striking them down.").
8 See SECONDMARKET, https://www.secondmarket.com/?t-edlogo (last visited Mar. 14, 2014); see
also Richard Teitelbaum, Facebook Drives SecondMarket Broking $1Billion Private Shares, BLOOMBERG
(Apr. 27, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-27/facebook-drives-secondmarket-
broking-l-billion-private-shares.html (recounting the history of SecondMarket).
' To be precise, firms with assets over $10 million and a class of equity security held by five hundred
or more persons had to register under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"). Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1964) (amended 2012). Section 12(g)(l) of the Exchange Act in
reality specifies a $1 million cutoff, but Rule 12g-I of the Exchange Act exempts firms with $10 million
or less in total assets. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2013). Registering under the Exchange Act means
filing a Form 10 with the SEC, describing its business in detail. Once registered, a firm must make
periodic filings and comply with proxy regulations. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Questioning the 500
Equity Holders Trigger, I HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 43, 43-44 (2011).
Io The impatient reader can see infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
H.R. 1965, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
12 See Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECTION CoMM'N,
http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/advindsea.shtml (search "Employer/Occupation" field for
"SecondMarket") (listing two SecondMarket employees as contributing $1000 each to Rep. Himes, one on
June 6, 2011, and the other on June 7, 2011).
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Why? One possibility is that SecondMarket is based in New York,13
reasonably close to Himes's home state of Connecticut,1 4 and that these
employees may reside in Connecticut or have a close relation to the state and
regularly engage in its political life. Yet the Federal Election Commission
("FEC") database does not include any record of either of these individuals
having made any political campaign contributions-except one donation to
a local New York Congresswoman-prior to Himes' introduction of H.R.
1965.15
The second confluence of legislative and donative activity occurred only
weeks later. On June 13, SecondMarket's CEO donated $1000 to David
Schweikert (R-AZ). 16 The very next day, Schweikert introduced H.R. 2167,
the Private Company Flexibility and Growth Act, which proposed raising
the threshold to 1000 shareholders and excluding even from that heightened
threshold most of SecondMarket's buyers and sellers. ' 7  Again,
SecondMarket's CEO had no obvious connection with Arizona and, save for
his earlier donation to Congressman Himes, had not, according to the
government's database, made any prior out-of-state campaign contributions
to anyone ever before.'
8
While some readers may be shocked by these events, others will shrug.
Everyone knows money matters in Washington. But two things are unique
about the SecondMarket story: the narrowness of the issue and the targeted
nature of the contributions.
This Article argues that the short time interval between the introduction
of the Himes bill and the SecondMarket employees' donation and the virtual
simultaneity of the introduction of the Schweikert bill and the second
donation raise enough of a red flag of corruption to bring into play the state's
13 Contact Us, SECONDMARKET, https://www.secondmarket.com/about/contact (last visited Feb. 18,
2015).
14 About Jim, HIMES.HOUSE.GOV, http://himes.house.gov/about-jim/biography (last visited Feb. 18,
2015).
"5 Additionally, SceondMarket was founded in 2004 by its CEO, so Himes had been associated with
the finn for 7 years at the time of the donation. About Us, SECONDMARKET,
https://www.secondmarket.com/about (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
6 See Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, supra note 12 (listing Rep.
Schweikert as receiving a June 13, 2011, donation of$ 1000 from a SecondMarket employee); Legislative
Proposals to Facilitate Small Bus. Capital Formation and Job Creation: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Capital Markets & Gov't Sponsored Entities of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong.
(2011) (listing Rep. Schweikert as a subcommittee member), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-1 12hhrg72604/html/CHRG-I 12hhrg72604.htm.
'1 Private Company Flexibility and Growth Act, H.R. 2167, 112th Cong. (2011). Only accredited
investors could buy shares on SecondMarket, and most of its sellers were employee shareholders. H.R.
2167 exempted both groups. Id
" See Appendix.
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interest in limiting campaign contributions. These individuals never made
an out-of-state contribution before this election cycle, and their brief foray
into out-of-state politics subsided as soon as the legislation they sought was
secured.
The obvious counterargument is that such reasoning is nothing more than
the familiar post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy: just because Schweitzer
introduced legislation the day after receiving a $1000 donation from a CEO
who had never made an out-of-state political donation before does not mean
that the donation caused the action in question.
This Article offers three arguments in response. First, I draw on the law
of contract, within which the quidpro quo phrase originated, to argue that a
finding of corruption does not require that a contribution be the "but for"
cause of political action. When assessing the presence of a bargain, contract
law is more concerned with external manifestations than with internal
mental states. Thus, inherent in the concept of quidpro quo is the notion that
appearances matter.
Second, McCutcheon follows a line of campaign finance cases that
specifies that the government may regulate to prevent not only corruption,
but also the appearance of corruption. Even without going so far as to
suggest that an actual quidpro quo exchange between donor and legislator
existed, the close timing surely gives the appearance of such an arrangement.
Third, for those skeptical that a paltry $1000 could matter to a legislator,
social science research that reaches back decades shows that receipt of even
small dollar-value items can trigger feelings of obligation in the receiver.
This "reciprocity principle," regularly observed in behavioral science labs,
also explains real-world practices such as a server leaving a candy with a
patron's bill or nonprofits sending pre-printed, individualized address labels
with their donation solicitations. In each case, the receipt of a gift-even a
trivial one-prompts the recipient to want to reciprocate.
Thus, the pattern of SecondMarket employees' giving suggests that there
might indeed be a cognizable risk of corruption or its appearance-again,
even stringently defined as quid pro quo corruption-when contributions
fall below the base limit amount. And after McCutcheon, every CEO is free
to donate up to $5200 to each and every senator and representative in
Congress.
The key point is that the base limits do not-as both the McCutcheon
plurality and dissent presume-provide an effective bulwark against
corruption. The SecondMarket example provides evidence that the base
limits' preventative measures are imperfect. And if that is so, then Chief
[Vol.XX-XI:45
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Justice Roberts' opinion, by its own logic, has over-privileged money-as-
speech.
Part I of this Article tells the story of the amendment of Section 12(g),
punctuated with an account of the campaign contributions of
SecondMarket's employees. Part II argues that these contributions may
qualify as corrupt under McCutcheon. Part III emphasizes the importance of
the base limits in the post-McCutcheon world. In particular, it highlights that
the risk of corruption may be inversely proportionate to the salience of the
issue. While on issues of major national concern the media and public
pressure may discipline corruption, on narrow and mundane issues, special
interests may be no less active and no less effective at using money to
achieve their aims. 19 Indeed, this very lack of attention may be what allows
their efforts to succeed. Part IV offers further lessons.
I. THE STORY OF SECTION 12(G)
Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act long imposed certain disclosure
requirements on private firms with over 499 shareholders, including the duty
to provide the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") with an annual
report and periodic quarterly filings.2" The imposition of these duties
imposed burdens over and above the simple cost of filing; they exposed
these firms to litigation risks and to the disadvantage of disclosing otherwise
hidden information to eager-eyed competitors. Most firms approaching 500
shareholders, conventional wisdom went, therefore elected simply to go
public-that is, to sell shares on the open market in order to expand business
capital in a context where they were going to have to make public-firm-type
disclosures in any event. Commentators have asserted that the old 500-
shareholder threshold triggered the initial public offerings ("IPOs") of such
prominent businesses as Apple, Google, and Facebook.
21
"9 For a similar account in the realm of lobbying, see Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and
the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191, 220 (2012) ("At other times, the issue of interest to the lobbyist
(and her client) is one about which the legislator has no firm position, or even knowledge, and one about
which the public is not paying any attention. In such circumstances the legislator is often willing to help
a friendly lobbyist achieve her client's interests .... ").
2 See Sjostrom, Jr., supra note 9, at 43-44 (summarizing the old provision and advocating for
exceptions to the rule).
2 See, e.g., Nicholas Carlson, Why The SEC Will Force Facebook To Go Public, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/why-the-sce-will-force-facebook-to-go-public-201 I-1
(explaining the special circumstances underlying SEC investigation); Danny Sullivan, Facebook to IPO in
2008 (It'll Have To), SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Oct. 26, 2007), http://searchcngineland.com/facebook-to-ipo-
in-2008-itlI-have-to-12547 (quoting reports that Exchange Act requirements forced Google's offering).
2015]
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Even so, the impact of Section 12(g) was never clear; in other words, the
question of the prevalence of the "unwilling public firm" was an open one.
In a separate work, this Author made use of an original dataset to ascertain
just how many firms, prior to the JOBS Act's passage, felt the bite of the
500-shareholder rule.2 2 Using publicly available data, the article examines
the number of shareholders of firms that went public from between 2000 and
2012. Of 1192 firms, only 35 (2.94%) went public with over 400
shareholders; only 27 (2.27%) with over 450 shareholders. 23 Even these
numbers may be somewhat overstated. Because firms with an expanding
number of shareholders may be older firms with more individuals clamoring
for liquidity, the data do not show the number of corporations near 500
shareholders that actually went public because of Section 12(g). Instead, the
evidence suggests that the number of firms that went public with over 400
shareholders captures most of the firms that may have gone public because
of Section 12(g)-and that number is small, indeed.
This research thus reveals that the 500-shareholder rule mattered only to
a small subset of extremely interested firms: those few that approached this
threshold and were threatened with being "forced" public, and those whose
business model depended on the firm staying private. This Section will focus
on the extraordinary efforts of two such firms to support an increase in the
500-shareholder threshold in 201 1--efforts that, combined with other
reform proposals, would crystallize in the JOBS Act of 2012.
The two firms were SecondMarket, Inc., and Wawa, Inc., a Pennsylvania-
based convenience store operator. 24 Each had a special interest in raising
the threshold. Wawa was rapidly approaching the 499 shareholder ceiling.25
If the law remained unchanged, it would need to reduce its shareholder count
by way of a reverse stock split that would cost it $40 million.2 6
SecondMarket's reason for opposing the 500-shareholder rule resulted from
the nature of its business. The firm provided a marketplace for the secondary
trading of the shares of still-private companies.2 7 Notably, certain wealthy
22 Usha Rodrigues, Private Firms and Public Disclosures: The Curious Case of Section 12(g), 2015
ILL. L. REV (forthcoming 2015).
23 id.
24 Phil Mattingly & Robert Schmidt, Startup Act Shows Silicon Valley Clout Growing in DC,
BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-31/startup-act-
shows-silicon-valley-clout-growing-in-dc.html.
25 id.
26 id.
27 See Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors-Part I:
Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 29 (2011) (statement of
Christopher T. Gheysens, Exec. V.P. and Chief Fin. & Admin. Officer, Wawa Inc.). at 34; see also Jen
[Vol.X-XXI:45
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investors-called accredited investors-were able to use SecondMarket's
exchange to purchase shares of Facebook before its IPO.28  Most
SecondMarket sellers sold only a portion of their shares; 29 thus, most sales
added to a firm's shareholder rolls, rather than substituting one shareholder
for another. As a result, Section 12(g)'s 500-shareholder limit threatened
SecondMarket's business model in two ways. First, as firms approached the
500-shareholder limit, they might go public, forsaking SecondMarket's
exchange for public exchanges like the New York Stock Exchange or
Nasdaq. Second, the in terrorem effect of the 500-shareholder rule might
encourage firms to avoid the SecondMarket exchange altogether, for fear of
running afoul of Section 12(g). Thus, the 500-shareholder rule
fundamentally endangered SecondMarket's business.
Both Wawa and SecondMarket employed a variety of techniques in
pursuit of the goal of revising the 500-shareholder rule. They spent a great
deal of money on lobbying efforts. Their employees testified before
Congress. And-most important for present purposes-some of their
employees made timely campaign contributions.
A. On the Hill
The most vocal and sustained argument for reform came from
SecondMarket.30 Its CEO, Barry Silbert, testified before both the House and
the Senate.3" On both occasions he echoed the concerns about Section
12(g)'s deleterious effects on firms' ability to attract investors and hire
employees using stock options. Indeed, Silbert was the only individual
quoted in the House report. As that Report stated:
Wieczner, Investing in private startups is a hot trend. But sorry, you're not invited, FORTUNE (Aug. 14,
2014, 7:36 AM), http://fortune.com/tag/secondmarket/ (describing SecondMarket's operations).
28 Barry Silbert, Not All Markets Are Created Equal, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 28, 2012),
http://techcrunch.com/2012/03/28/sccondmarket-see/ ("Only "accredited" investors are eligible to buy
private company stock on SecondMarket, and we have established a process to ensure that only
accredited investors buy stock."); 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2013) (defining accredited investor as, among
other categories, individuals with over $200,000 in income or $1 million in assets).29 See Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law's Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3411 (2013)
(describing that the second market allows employees to liquidate a portion of their assets), available at
http://fordhamlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/Vol_8 /RodriguesMay.pdf.
3
o See Garett Sloane, Tech Companies New Lobbying Force in DC, NEW YORK POST (Apr. 1, 2012,
4:00 AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/flcxing-muscles tezyRbXX ee4BuGpqV9StUK.
31 Legislative Proposals to Facilitate Small Business Capital Formation and Job Creation: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. of
Financial Services, 112 t' Cong. 35-36 (2011); Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, Investment of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 112"' Cong. 8-9 (2011).
2015]
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Barry Silbert, Chief Executive Officer of SecondMarket,
Inc., explained that the 500 shareholder threshold "has
created a disincentive for private companies to hire new
employees, or acquire other businesses for stock, as these
private companies are fearful of taking on too many
shareholders." Mr. Silbert also testified that the current
threshold "discourages companies from providing stock
option-based compensation to employees, removing one of
the great economic incentives attracting the country's best
and brightest employees to startups., 32
Neither Silbert nor his interlocutors ever acknowledged that the 500-
shareholder rule represented a serious problem for the business model of
Silbert's own firm, and that he might therefore have self-interested reasons
for wanting it changed.
Wawa started out as a seller of dairy products and nonalcoholic drinks in
1905,33 and opened its first convenience store in 1964.34 In 2011, Wawa
faced an urgent problem. Wawa's Christopher Gheysens, Executive VP and
Chief Financial and Administrative Officer, testified before the Senate that
"[w]e are at an inflection point" because the firm was approaching the 500-
shareholder threshold. 35  Because of Section 12(g), Gheysens testified,
Wawa and companies like it would be "limited in their ability to grow
because remaining private means dollar for dollar we would have to take
capital dollars for new store growth and job creation away to be able to
restrict and reduce the number of shareholders we have just to remain private
under that outdated rule."' 36 In particular, Wawa planned to back away from
the 500-shareholder threshold by squeezing out owners of small lots of its
shares by effectuating a reverse stock split. According to Gheysens,
however, this plan was bad for both Wawa and the social good. As he put
the point, Wawa faced a "one-time probably $40 million ... reverse stock
split that would be dollar for dollar away from new store growth. '37
32 H.R. REP. No. 112-327, at 2 (2011).
3' Ice Cream, Milk, or Swimwear?, 18 NO. 10 WESTLAW J. INTELL. PROP. 11 (2011).
34 About Us, WAWA, https://wawa.com/About.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2015, 5:58 PM).
" Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors-Part I: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, I I2th Cong. 29 (2011) (statement of
Christopher T. Gheysens, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial & Administrative Officer for
Wawa, Inc.).36 Id. at 34.
" Id. Reverse stock splits involve the corporation issuing new shares that are worth much more than
the original shares. For example, in a 100-for-I reverse stock split, a shareholder with 500 old shares
[Vol.XXXI:45
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Senator Toomey of Pennsylvania clearly appreciated the concerns of his
local corporate constituent, 38 and he quickly assumed the role of advocate
for Wawa, beginning with the notion that the company was open to reform
regardless of how it came. To develop the idea, Toomey directed a question
to Wawa's Gheysens: "Does it make any difference to you guys whether the
ceiling on the number of permissible shareholders is lifted by regulation,
presumably by the SEC, or through legislation of Congress? 39 Gheysens
responded: "It does not. Either Congress or by rule of the SEC, the process
to us, we are indifferent. The importance for us really is the timeline. We are
at an inflection point. 40
Senator Toomey then turned his attention to Meredith B. Cross of the
SEC's Division of Corporation Finance, asking her to provide "any sense
for a timeframe" for when the agency would reach a decision on raising the
500-shareholder limit.4 1 Cross responded:
[W]hen the limit was originally put in, it followed a robust
study to understand the costs and the benefits and the
economic consequences of a change in the rule. So we are
doing that now. That takes time, I am afraid. So I expect that
we would get the work done on the study during 2012, and
then the Commission, if they decide they want to change the
rule, would need to put out a rule proposal. So it is at least.
.more than a year away.4 2
Senator Toomey was not happy with this answer, noting in response: "I
just have to say that is disappointing. 43
The SEC's "disappointing" response to Toomey's question left Wawa
with no option except to seek relief in Congress. If Wawa tried to lobby the
SEC for relief, it would confront an extended delay, as well as the inevitable
uncertainty attendant to agency action. Any proposed rule would have to
would receive 5 new ones. In the course of the reverse split, corporations often cash out the holders of
fractional shares. Thus, in the example, a holder of 50 shares would wind up with a half-share, which the
corporation could force the fractional holder to sell back to the firm at market price. Thus reverse stock
splits are a way for corporations to eliminate small stockholders. See Jesse M. Fried, Symposium, Firms
Gone Dark, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 135, 141-42 (2009). Wawa did not elaborate on the $40 million number,
but presumably the cost of cashing out (and thus eliminating) small holders comprised most of the figure.
3 Spurring Job Growth, supra note 36, at 29-30.
39 Id. at 29.
4°ld. at 34 (2011).
41 Id. at 30.
42
Id.
43
Id.
2015]
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survive the rigors of a notice-and-comment process and potential follow-up
revision. 44 Even if Wawa obtained a favorable final rule, that rule could face
exacting judicial scrutiny. And so, the far better course was for the affected
firms simply to lobby for a change directly from Congress, obtaining a fast
result that was all-but-immunized from judicial second-guessing.
B. Lobbying and Campaign Contributions
The effect of the 500-shareholder rule on SecondMarket's business
model was profound. Thus it may not be surprising that SecondMarket
lobbied for reform, or that its employees made campaign contributions to
members of Congress involved in the reform effort.45 But two pieces of this
story are particularly instructive. The first involves the sequencing of these
contributions. The second involves the relatively low dollar volume of the
contributions the SecondMarket employees made, especially in comparison
to the firm's lobbying budget. The culmination of the tale is that multiple
bills that came together to produce H.R. 3606, the bill that became the JOBS
Act-all to the advantage of both Wawa and SecondMarket.4 6
SecondMarket lobbied hard for a change to Section 12(g), 47 spending
$210,000 in 201148 and $170,000 in 2012. 49  Wawa also agitated for
change, 50 lobbying Democratic senators in Delaware and Pennsylvania to
take up the cause.51 It spent nearly $40,000 on lobbyists to push forward its
44Id.
" Federal law requires that the treasurer of a political committee use "best efforts" to obtain,
maintain, and submit information on donors' employer. 52 U.S.C. § 30102(i) (2015). FEC regulations
specify that "best efforts" require that "[a]ll written solicitations for contributions include a clear request
for the contributor's full name, mailing address, occupation and name of employer." II C.F.R. §
104.7(b)(1)(i) (2014). If the contributor does not provide employer information, then within 30 days after
receipt of the contribution the treasurer must make "at least one effort after the receipt of the contribution
to obtain the missing information," and if the effort is in writing, must include a pre-addressed return
postcard or envelope. 11 C.F.R. § 104.7(b)(2) (2014). If there is a pattern of missing employer
information, the FEC might investigate or a competing candidate may lodge a complaint. See 11 C.F.R.
§ 11.3(a) (2014) (outlining the procedures for complaints and investigations).
4 For a full timeline of the history of Section 12(g)'s amendment, readers should see the Appendix,
infra at p. 68.
" See Sloane, supra note 3 1.
41 SecondMarket Holdings 2011, OPEN SECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/
clicntsum.php?id=F I 2960&year=201 I (last visited April 12, 2015).
" Second Market Holdings 2012, OPEN SECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/
clientsum.php?id=F I2960&year=2012 (last visited April 12, 2015).
" Andrew Ramonas, Nixon Peabody Hired by Texas Grocery Chainfor JOBS Act Lobbying Effort, THE
BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGALTIMES (Apr. 18, 2012, 3:23 PM), http://legaltime.typepad.com/blt/2012/04/nixon-
peabody-hired-by-texas-grocery-chain-for-jobs-act-lobbying-effort.html.
51 d.
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position-$40,000 more than it had ever spent in lobbying Congress on any
issue before. 52
As will be seen, the money these corporations spent on lobbying dwarfed
the amount of their employees' campaign contributions. And there is no
doubt that these lobbying expenditures played a significant role in the overall
effort for reform. Even so, this Article focuses on campaign contributions,
rather than lobbying efforts, for two reasons.
First, the lobbying data are problematic because of the law governing
their disclosure. Under the Lobby Disclosure Act of 1995,53 lobbyists must
register with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of
Representatives and make quarterly disclosures of their lobbying activities.
54
Because reports are made only every three months, the data do not permit
the kind of granular temporal analysis possible with campaign contribution
data, which specify a particular date for each contribution.
55
Second, whether lobbying actually drove the legislation increasing
Section 12(g)'s shareholder threshold is, for present purposes, largely beside
the point. Lobbying is something of a "black box." 56 Critics see lobbyists as
corruptors of the ideal legislative process, who use bribes, favors, and gifts
to change the position of politicians. 57 Defenders see them as zealous
advocates of their clients' position, providing needed context to distracted
legislators as to the effect of government policy in the real-world. 58 Both
52 See Wawa Inc., OPEN SECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensccrets.org/orgs/
summary.php?id=D000029767&cycle=2012 (last visited Mar. 15, 2014) (noting $30,000 in lobbying
expenditures by Wawa Inc. in 2012, all to Nixon Peabody, LLP); Wawa Inc., OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.openseercts.org/orgs/lobby.php?id=D000029767 (last visited Mar. 9, 2014) (noting $10,000 in
lobbying expenditures by Wawa Inc. in 2011, all to Nixon Peabody, LLP); Nixon Peabody. LLP,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/firmbills.php ?id=D000022157&year=2012 (last
visited Mar. 9,2014) (listing Wawa Inc. as a Nixon Peabody, LLP client only on bills pertaining to the JOBS
Act for 2012); Nixon Peabody LLP, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/
firmlbs.php?id=D000022157&year'2011 (last visited Mar. 9,2014) (listing Wawa Inc. asa Nixon Peabody,
LLP client only on bills pertaining to the JOBS Act for 2011).
"3 Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1614 (2006 & Supp.
1 2007)).
2 U.S.C. § 1603 (2014).
5 Another flaw of the data is that they do not specify the particular amounts expended on each bill
for which the organization lobbied. Thus, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce might disclose that it spent
$50 million in a quarter lobbying for twenty-five different bills. See id. This lack of specificity is not a
problem for the Section 12(g) lobbying, however, because the interests of both SecondMarket and Wawa
were so narrowly focused on raising its threshold.
56 See Hasen, supra note 19, at 216.
57See id. at 217.
'
6 See, e.g., Nicholas W. Allard, Lobbying is an Honorable Profession: The Right to Petition and the
Competition to Be Right, 19 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 23, 35-36 (2008) ("[Plublic policy advocacy is
inextricably woven into the fabric of our constitutional system because it plays a vital role in promoting
effective representative government.").
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positions are plausible, and it may well be that the lobbying expenditures of
Wawa and SecondMarket were far more influential than the campaign
contributions detailed here.
But the focus of this Article does not have to do with lobbying; it has to
do with whether, even applying the crabbed McCutcheon definition of
corruption as quidpro quo corruption, contributions below the base limits
might qualify as corruption or create the appearance of corruption. My
account provides both new empirical evidence and social science data that
suggest that even relatively low-dollar contributions can be corrupting. As a
result, it is of only peripheral significance whether the "real work" of
spending was done on the lobbying front rather than by way of campaign
contributions. It suffices that the campaign contributions influenced, or
appeared to influence, legislators in a corrupting way.
This Article will return to the question of lobbying at the end. For now,
the focus turns to employee campaign contributions. Corporations are
forbidden from making direct campaign contributions.59 Their employees
are not.
60
With regard to timing, as mentioned earlier, two SecondMarket employee
contributions were of particular significance. CEO Barry Silbert and
SecondMarket's head of public affairs, Mark Murphy, each donated $1000
to Representative Himes in June of 2011, two weeks after Himes introduced
a bill requesting a study of shareholder registration thresholds. 61
The next month, Silbert donated another $1000 to Representative
Schweikert, and this action took place the day before he introduced H.R.
2167, the Private Company Flexibility and Growth Act (the "PCFG Act"),
proposing to raise the threshold to 1000 shareholders. 62 Schweikert's bill
not only sought to raise the Section 12(g) threshold from 500 to 1000, but
also moved to exclude from the definition of holders of record both
accredited investors and persons who had acquired shares by way of
employee compensation plans.63 This exclusion was highly consequential to
SecondMarket because only accredited investors could buy shares on its
exchange, and most of the sellers it dealt with were employee or ex-
59 52 U.S.C.S. § 30118 (Lexis 2014).
Id. § 30116.
61 Transaction Query by Individual Contributor, Federal Election Comm., http://fec.gov/finance/
disclosure/norindsca.shtm (search for individual contributor by name).
62 Private Company Flexibility and Growth Act, H.R. 2167, 112th Cong. (2011).
63 See id. §§ 2-3. Accredited investors are individuals with a net annual income of over $200,000 or
a total net worth of over one million dollars may invest in securities that are not registered, provided that
those securities meet the general disclosure requirements of Rule 502. Id. § 230.501(a)(5)-(6).
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employee shareholders. 64  H.R. 2167 thus not only doubled the threshold,
but also excluded entirely from the count the lion's share of individuals who
traded on SecondMarket-by definition all of its buyers, and most of its
sellers. 65
These early donations made by Silbert and Murphy were not the end of
the story. SecondMarket's employees continued to make active campaign
contributions throughout 2011-2012, as proto-JOBS Act bills wended their
way through Congress. In July and August, SecondMarket employees
donated $5000 to Schweikert.66
On October 17 and 20, two SecondMarket employees donated $1000 to
Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), 67 less than three weeks before Warner joined
Senator Toomey in introducing the S. 1824 Private Company Flexibility and
Growth Act ("PCFGA"). 68  This bill proposed raising the shareholder
threshold to 2000 and not including employees with vested stock options in
the count.69
On November 14, five SecondMarket employees collectively gave
$13,000 to Sen. Schumer (D-NY).7° Schumer was an attractive donation
target for two reasons. First, on December 1, Schumer introduced S. 1933,
Reopening American Capital Markets to Emerging Growth Companies Act
64 Rodrigues, Securities Law's Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV 3389, 3404 (2013).
65 See Silbert, supra note 29 and accompanying text.
66 See Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECTION COMM'N,
http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/advindsea.shtml (search "Employer/Occupation" field for
"SecondMarket") (listing five SecondMarket donations of$1000 each to Rep. Schweikert in July and August).
On September 21, Barry Silbert, SecondMarket's CEO, testified before the House's Committee on Financial
Services. Legislative Proposals to Facilitate Small Business Capital Formation and Job Creation: Hearing
Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Markets & Gov "t Sponsored Entities of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th
Cong. 35 (2011) (statement of Barry Silbert, Founder & Chief. Exec. Officer, SecondMarket, Inc.), available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-1 12hhrg72604/html/CHRG- I 12hhrg72604.htm.
67 See Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECTION COMM'N,
http://www.fec.gov/financc/disclosure/advindsea.shtml (search "Employer/Occupation" field for
"SecondMarket") (listing two SecondMarket employees' donations of$ 1000 each to Sen. Wamer in October).
I Private Company Flexibility and Growth Act, S. 1824, 112th Cong. (2011) (listing Sen. Warner
as a co-sponsor).
69 The bill went to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and ultimately died there.
See Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors-Part 1: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. (2011) (debating S. 1824); S.
1824 (112'.): Private Company Flexibility and Growth Act, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/l 12/s1824 (last visited Mar. 10, 2014) (noting S. 1824 died in committee).
70 See Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECTION COMM'N,
http://www.fce.gov/finance/disclosure/advindsea.shtml (search "Employer/Occupation" field for
"SecondMarket") (listing five SecondMarket employees' donations on Nov. 14, 2011, to Impact, totaling
$13,000); Impact, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.openseerets.org/pacs/lookup2. php?strlD=C00348607 (last
visited Mar. 11, 2014) (affiliating Impact with Sen. Schumer); Spurring Job Growth Through Capital
Formation While Protecting Investors-Part I: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban
Affairs, 112th Cong. ii (2011) (listing committee members).
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of 2011.1 Although Schumer's S. 1933 proposed no changes to the
shareholder threshold under Section 12(g), it embodied other pro-business
provisions ultimately incorporated in the JOBS Act. 72 Second, on November
14, Warner and Toomey's PCFGA bill languished in the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.73 Notably, Senator Schumer also
was on that selfsame committee, as was Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL).74
On December 30, 2011, a SecondMarket employee gave $1000 to Defend
America PAC, Shelby's political action committee.75
On December 8, Representative Mark Fincher introduced H.R. 3606: the
Reopening American Capital Markets to Emerging Growth Companies Act
of 2011, which would later acquire the moniker "Jumpstarting Our Business
Startups." 76 On February 15, this bill, which did not propose any change
to the shareholder threshold, was reported by the House Financial Services
Committee. 77  On March 8, Jack Miller of North Carolina introduced an
amendment on the House floor to alter the shareholder threshold to 2000
persons or 500 persons who are not accredited, and to exclude shares
acquired from stock options from the count. 78  The move built on
Representative Schweikert's earlier proposal to raise the threshold to 1000
7 Reopening American Capital Markets to Emerging Growth Companies Act of 2011, S. 1933, 112th
Cong. (2011) (listing Sen. Warner as a co-sponsor).
72 See id. (outlining various exemptions for "emerging growth companies").
" See Private Company Flexibility and Growth Act, supra note 82 (documenting the demise of S.
1824).
' Members of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 2011-2012 (112 th Congress),
BALLOTPEDIA.ORG, http://ballotpedia.org/United_States SenateCommittee-on Banking,_
Housing, and UrbanAffairs#2011-2012_.28112th Congress.29 (last visited July 9, 2015).
" Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECTION COMM'N,
http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/advindsea.shtml (search "Employer/Occupation" field for
"SecondMarket") (showing a SecondMarket employee contributed $1000 to Defend America PAC on Dec. 30,
2011); Defend America PAC, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/lo
okup2.php?strlD=C00325993&cyclc=2014 (last visited Mar. 15, 2014) (showing Sen. Shelby's affiliation with
Defend America PAC).
76 Reopening American Capital Markets to Emerging Growth Companies Act of 2011, H.R. 3606,
112th Cong. (2011). When H.B. 3606 was reported on in the House on March 1, 2012, it was still titled
Reopening American Capital Markets to Emerging Growth Companies Act of2011. See H.R. REP. NO.
112-406, at 1 (2012). By the time the bill was passed by both the House and the Senate on March 28,
2012, Reopening American Capital Markets to Emerging Growth Companies became the heading of
Title I and the entire bill was renamed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act. See Text of Jumpstart
Our Business Startups, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/I 2/hr3606/text (last
visited Mar. 16, 2014) (showing the title of the bill after it passed both the House and the Senate on
March 28, 2012).
7 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, H.R. 3606, 112th Cong. §§ 2-3 (2012).
71 158 CONG. REC. H1278-79 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2012) (text of amendment submitted by Rep. Miller
(D-NC)).
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and exclude from the count both shares acquired through stock options and
those held by accredited investors, and effectively gutted Section 12(g). 79
SecondMarket employees remained active campaign contributors as H.R.
3606 made its way through Congress. On March 9, the day after H.R.
3606-now including the Schweikert-Miller amendment-cleared the
House and moved to the Senate, an employee gave $1000 to Sen. Toomey,80
and on March 15 another employee gave Senator Toomey an additional
$1000.81 Recall that Senator Toomey was a sympathetic advocate for Wawa
in committee; Senator Toomey was a sympathetic advocate for Wawa in
committee; he was also a member of the Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs. 82 On March 20, four employees gave a total of $4500 to
Senator Tim Johnson (D-SD), the chair of that same committee. 83 On March
22, the bill passed the Senate with some amendments not pertaining to
Section 12(g),84 and on March 27 the amended version passed the full
House. 85  That same day Mark Murphy, SecondMarket's head of public
71 See Usha Rodrigues, The Once and Future Irrelevancy of Section 12(g), 2015 ILL. L. REV.
(forthcoming). By Schweikert's account, the amendment to H.R. 3606 was the product of a "back and
forth" between his staffand Miller's staffthat resulted in a compromise. See 158 CONG. REC. H1278-79
(daily cd. Mar. 8, 2012) (statement of Rep. Sehweikert (R-AZ)) ("We've [Rep. Schweikert and Rep.
Miller] gone back and forth in discussion over the last year, you know, what should the number be. We
all came to a collective agreement that 500 was far too small for capital formation. Was 2,000
appropriate? Well, should it be 2,000 accredited? Well, what should be the unaccredited portion for
that? I think this is what we'll call an appropriate compromise, and I thank Mr. Miller for bringing this
to us and helping us get there."). In another work the Author of the present Article has provided data that
show that firms rarely approached the 500 figure even when counting employee shares. Rodrigues, supra,
at.
8 Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECTION COMm'N,
http://www.fee.gov/finance/disclosure/advindsea.shtml (search "Employer/Occupation" field for
"SecondMarket") (listing one SecondMarket employee as contributing $1000 to Sen. Toomey on Mar. 9,2012).
" Id (search "Employer/Occupation" field for "SecondMarket") (listing one SecondMarket employee as
contributing $1000 to Sen. Toomey on Mar. 15, 2012).
82 Members of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 2011-2012 (112' Congress),
BALLOTPEDIA.ORG, http://ballotpedia.org/United StatesSenateCommittee on Banking,_
Housing, and UrbanAffairs#2011-2012 .28112th Congress.29 (last visited July 9, 2015).
"' Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECTION CONMM'N,
http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/advindsea.shtml (search "Employer/Occupation" field for
"SccondMarket") (listing two SecondMarket employees as contributing $1000 each and one employee
contributing $2500 to Sen. Johnson on Mar. 20,2012).
4 See H.R. 3606 (112"h): Jumpstart Our Business Startups, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.
govtrack.us/congress/bills/i 12/s 1824 (last visited Mar. 11, 2014) (noting that H.R. 3606 passed through
the Senate with changes on Mar. 22, 2012); Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, H.R. 3606 Amend.,
112th Cong. (2012) (amending H.R. 3606 with regard to crowdfunding).
"5 See H.R. 3606 (I 12Th)." Jumpstart Our Business Startups, GOVTRACK.uS, https://www.
govtrack.us/congress/bills/l12/s1824 (last visited Mar. 11, 2014) (noting the House accepted the
Senate's changes to H.R. 3606 on Mar. 27, 2012).
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affairs, gave $500 to Himes' campaign.8 6 Also on March 27, the date H.R.
3606 passed the House,8 7  SecondMarket employees gave $5000 to
Representative Shelley Berkley (D-NV),88 who was then in a heated and
ultimately unsuccessful bid for a Senate seat.89
Wawa employees were not as politically engaged as SecondMarket's
employees, but six of them made a total of $11,000 in donations to the
Friends of Pat Toomey political action campaign on June 27, 2012,90 two
months after the passage of the JOBS Act. Wawa is based in Pennsylvania,
so the mere fact that employees donated to the campaign of a Senator from
that state is unsurprising. However, these donations were the only campaign
contributions listed for these individuals in the FEC database going back
more than ten years. 9'
So what does this story disclose about the intersection of campaign
contributions and legislative action? The most notable correlation occurs at
the outset, when the sponsors of two bills dealing with the shareholder
threshold issue received donations within weeks or, in the case of
Representative Schweikert, within a day of the key proposal from employees
86 Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECI'ION COMM'N,
http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/advindsca.shtml (search "Employer/Occupation" field for
"SecondMarket") (listing one SecondMarket employee as contributing $500 to Rep. Himes on Mar. 27, 2012).
87 See H.R. 3606 (112 h): Jumpstart Our Business Startups, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.
govtrack.us/congrcss/bills/1 12/s 1824 (last visited July 9, 2015) (noting the House suspended the rules
and on a 380 - 41 vote, accepted the Senate's changes to H.R. 3606, on Mar. 27, 2012).
88 Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECTION COMM'N,
http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/advindsea.shtml (search "Employer/Occupation" field for
"SecondMarket") (listing two SecondMarket employees as contributing $1250 each and one employee
contributing $2500 to Rep. Berkley on Mar. 27, 2012).
89 See Michelle Merlin, Hot Race for Nevada Senate Seat: Dean Heller vs. Shelley Berkley,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, (Nov. 2, 2012, 2:07 PM), http://www.opcnsecrets.org/news/2012/11/hot-race-for-
nevada-scnate-scat-dea.html (describing the tight race); Shelley Berkley Election Results: Democrat
Loses to Dean Heller in Nevada Senate Race, HUFFPOST POLITICS (Nov. 7, 2012, 9:20 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/shelley-berklcy-election-result s-2012_n_2049717.html
(stating that Berkley ultimately lost the tight race).
9 Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECTION COMM'N,
http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/advindsea.shtml (search "Employer/Occupation" field for "Wawa")
(showing five Wawa employees contributed $1000 to Friends of Pat Toomey on June 27,2012, and one Wawa
employee made two $2500 contributions on June 27,2012).
9' Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECTION COMM'N,
http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/advindsea.shtml (search "Individual Name" field "Compitello,
William") (showing a single donation to Friends of Pat Toomey); id. (search "Individual Name" field
"Eckhardt, Michael") (showing a single donation to Friends of Pat Toomey); id. (search "Individual
Name" field "Gheysens, Chris") (showing the June 27, 2012 contribution and one other to Wawa Political
Action Committee); id (search "Individual Name" field "Pulos, Catherine") (showing the June 27, 2012
contribution and one other to Wawa Political Action Committee); id. (search "Individual Name" field
"Schroeder, Nathaniel"); id. (search "Individual Name" field "Stoeckel, Howard") (showing no other
campaign contributions).
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who had never given to any out-of-state federal candidate before.92 Later
contributions focused on the members of the Senate, as S. 1824 sought to
make its way out of committee. Committee members Warner, Schumer,
Toomey, Johnson and Shelby received $2000, $13,000, $2000, $4500, and
$1000 respectively from SecondMarket employees.
These events shine a light on McCutcheon's articulation of campaign
finance law. We turn in the next Part to the lessons they offer about emerging
constitutional limits in this field.
II. DO THE SECONDMARKET EMPLOYEE DONATIONS QUALIFY AS
CORRUPT UNDER MCCUTCHEON?
McCutcheon, after reiterating the bedrock principle that Congress may
regulate campaign contributions only to protect against corruption or the
appearance of corruption, clarified that corruption in the campaign finance
context means quid pro quo corruption, with direct contributions to a
candidate's own campaign coffers posing the greatest danger in that
regard. 93 It assumed that, under this definition, contributions beneath the
base limit that a citizen can donate to a single candidate-currently $5200
under federal law-"do not create a cognizable risk of corruption."
94
This Part suggests that, under McCutcheon's narrow definition, the
SecondMarket employee contributions may qualify as corrupt. First, it
elaborates on McCutcheon's new definition of corruption as quid pro quo
corruption, highlighting the special dangers posed by direct campaign
contributions (rather than contributions to political action committees). The
contributions of SecondMarket's employees are precisely these types of
contributions.
Next, this Part makes clear that contributions need not rise to the level of
bribery in order to be considered corrupt. Criminal bribery presents a
separate and distinct issue--one with a higher burden of proof-and one,
because of the Speech and Debate clause, uniquely hard to prove in the halls
of Congress.
9 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
9 MeCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
94Id. at 1439.
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A. Corruption Means Quid Pro Quo Corruption, and Direct Campaign
Contributions are Especially Dangerous
The McCutcheon plurality makes four points of interest here. First, it
equates corruption with quid pro quo corruption, observing, "[t]hat Latin
phrase captures the notion of a direct exchange of an official act for
money. ' 95 For the plurality, at least, "[t]he hallmark of corruption is the
financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors. ' 96 Moreover, the
McCutcheon plurality emphasizes that direct campaign contributions pose a
greater risk of quidpro quo corruption than expenditures made on behalf of
a candidate because money flows directly to a candidate, rather than passing
through an intermediary: "there is not the same risk of quid pro quo
corruption or its appearance when money flows through independent actors
to a candidate, as when a donor contributes to a candidate directly. 97
The McCutcheon plurality emphasizes this point repeatedly. The core
problem is with large contributions made directly to a candidate.
In analyzing the base limits, Buckley made clear that the risk
of corruption arises when an individual makes large
contributions to the candidate or officeholder
himself....Buckley's analysis of the aggregate limit under
[the Federal Employees Compensation Act ("FECA")] was
similarly confined. The Court noted that the aggregate limit
guarded against an individual's funneling-through
circumvention-"massive amounts of money to a
particular candidate." (emphasis added). . . . We have
reiterated that understanding several times. See, e.g.,
National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S., at
497, 105 S.Ct. 1459 (quidpro quo corruption occurs when
"[e]lected officials are influenced to act contrary to their
obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to
themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns"
(emphasis added)); Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition
for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 297, 102 S.Ct.
434, 70 L.Ed.2d 492 (1981) (Buckley's holding that
contribution limits are permissible "relates to the perception
9' See id. at 1441 (citing McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 266 (1991)).
9 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (citing Fcd. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985)).
97 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452.
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of undue influence of large contributors to a candidate");
McConnell, 540 U.S., at 296, 124 S.Ct. 619 (opinion of
KENNEDY, J.) (quid pro quo corruption in Buckley
involved "contributions that flowed to a particular
candidate's benefit" (emphasis added)). 98
In the above quotation, it was the McCutcheon plurality that supplied the
emphasis, making it clear that direct campaign contributions present the
critical problem.
The question whether the plurality fairly reads prior precedent on this
point is a fair one. Zephyr Teachout describes the rebirth of quid-pro-quo-
only corruption like a kind of Athena, springing from Zeus' head but
claiming eternal existence: "For twenty-two years, the Court clearly
explained (in majority opinions) that quid pro quo was but one type of
corruption-in Wisconsin Right to Life, quid pro quo reappears as the heart
of corruption."99 The dissent in McCutcheon vociferously protests the
reduction of corruption's meaning to quid pro quo alone.'00  The
McCutcheon plurality itself admits, "we have not always spoken about
corruption in a clear or consistent voice."' 0 For present purposes, however,
this Article takes at face value the plurality's assertion that only quid pro
quo corruption counts as corruption in campaign finance, with direct
contributions posing the greatest danger of corruption.
Taking the two most obvious SecondMarket donations, we have two
examples of contributions close in time to representatives introducing
favorable legislation. The question is, do these contributions relate to the
political process in such a way that they constitute the kind of quidpro quo
corruption the government may legislate to thwart? To answer that question
we must first differentiate corruption from bribery.
98 Id. at 1460-61.
9 Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 391 (2009).
1o The dissent pointed out that in prior cases the Court had resisted efforts to restrict the meaning of
corruption to quid pro quo: "We specifically rejected efforts to define 'corruption' in ways similar to
those the plurality today accepts. We added: 'Just as troubling to a functioning democracy as classic quid
pro quo corruption is the danger that officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or the desires of
their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who have made large financial contributions
valued by the officeholder."' McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1470 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing McConncll
v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
101 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451.
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B. Bribery Distinguished
In an early dissent, Justice Thomas directed attention to a key point: any
discussion of campaign finance law must deal with the distinction, if there
is one, between bribery and corruption.° 2 Justice Thomas's view is that
there is no need for specialized campaign finance regulation at all because
longstanding criminal bribery laws are enough: "Federal bribery laws are
designed to punish and deter the corrupt conduct the Government seeks to
prevent under FECA, and disclosure laws work to make donors and donees
accountable to the public for any questionable financial dealings in which
they may engage."'' 0 3 What counts as bribery and whether there is another
category of activity that qualifies as more general "corruption" are thus
important questions.
A proper starting point for distinguishing bribery from corruption is with
a paradigm case. The "archetypal corruption" occurs when a political actor
accepts money as direct payment for political action. 0 4 Such action is
coextensive with bribery, and it is a crime. One reason why campaign
contributions are not classic bribes is because the transferred money does
not go directly into the politician's pocket. Campaign contributions are in
effect a special kind of currency, exchangeable only for one specific
purpose. As Professor David Strauss explains:
They can be spent only in order to gather votes, directly or
indirectly. They do not go into the legislator's pocket....
That means that these bribes have only a certain kind of
value to the recipient. In a sense they are like vouchers,
redeemable only for a certain purpose. 105
Put another way, the legislator is "[using] the power of her office, not for
personal enrichment, but in order to remain in office longer."' 016 Strauss
posits that "[i]n a democracy that is not necessarily a bad thing for an official
to do."'1 7 After all, the money a candidate receives, as she spends money in
" Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604,641 (1996)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
"03 Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 643 (1996)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
'o See Teachout, supra note 102, at 388.
'0 David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1369, 1372 (1994).
"6Id. at 1373.
107 id.
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an effort to stay in office, allows her to explain more broadly her policies
and beliefs to the electorate as a whole.108
The story of Section 12(g) does not involve a classic case of bribery. But
it does raise the question of whether the ideas behind bribery laws should
carry over to the campaign finance context. Professor Lowenstein identifies
the elements of bribery as: (1) that the case involve a public official, (2) that
the defendant have a corrupt intent, (3) that the official receive some type of
benefit-"anything of value," (4) that there be a relationship between the
thing of value and an official act, and (5) that "[t]he relationship must
involve an intent to influence the public official (or to be influenced if the
defendant is the official) in the carrying out of the official act."' 9 Buckley
v. Valeo established that campaign contributions count as a "thing of
value"1 0 for the candidate. Indeed, even Justice Thomas tacitly agreed that
campaign contributions can count as bribes when he relied on bribery laws
to police the field."' Moreover, courts do not require "an actual, bilateral
agreement"" 2 for bribery to occur. The "intent to influence" element is a
controversial one, 1 3 but "[a] bribe can occur even if it is intended only by
the briber or only by the recipient."' 14
Professor Lowenstein would likely find that the SecondMarket employee
campaign contributions satisfy the elements of bribery. Indeed, according to
his seminal article Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics,
"Under most bribery statutes as they have been interpreted by most courts,
most special interest campaign contributions are bribes." ' 5 One example
Professor Lowenstein provides involves contributions "given to members of
legislative committees important to the contributor without regard either to
ideology or to electoral need.""116 In his view, such payments can only be
explained as "intended to influence the official actions of recipients," 17 and
thus they qualify as bribes.
This example of bribery by Professor Lowenstein maps neatly onto the
SecondMarket employee donations. First, the SecondMarket employees
8 1d. at 1375.
9 Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L.
REV. 784, 796 (1985).
"' Id. at 809.
... See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 428 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
112 Lowenstein, supra note 112, at 820.
113 Id. at 821.
1 4 1d at 820.
'" Id. at 828.
11
6 Id. at 826.
117 id.
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contributed to Democrats (Representative Himes, Senator Warner, Senator
Schumer, Senator Tim Johnson) and Republicans (Representative
Schweikert, Senator Toomey, Senator Shelby) alike. 118 Second, in each case
they were made to sitting members of Congress when the donor had made
no out-of-state political contribution prior to the 2011-2012 election cycle. 1"9
Third, all of the recipients either introduced or co-sponsored promising bills,
or served on influential committees. 120 Certainly there is no doubt that in
the two most prominent examples, a SecondMarket employee gave a $1000
contribution to a public official-a legislator-with an intent to influence
that legislator in the carrying out of an official act of introducing legislation.
The fly in the ointment involves the question of whether these individuals
had the requisite "corrupt intent" needed to establish bribery. This question
brings us back to defining corruption. Here there was no proof of any explicit
agreement between legislator and donor of a quidpro quo nature. (Indeed,
one is in good company in suspecting such agreements rarely exist). 21
Professor Lowenstein might well respond, however, that no actual
agreement is needed to establish bribery.
The Speech and Debate Clause122 complicates matters even more,
because it makes it far more difficult to prove criminal bribery by a member
of Congress. In particular, in United States v. Helstoski the Court interpreted
this clause as prohibiting the introduction of legislative actions as evidence
in bribery cases, even while acknowledging that it would make prosecuting
such cases more difficult. 23 In reaching this result the Court emphasized
that "the Speech or Debate Clause was designed to preclude prosecution of
Members for legislative acts."' 124
To be clear, this Article is not arguing that the SecondMarket employee
donations qualify as bribes. There are two more fundamental points in the
picture. First, given the Speech and Debate Clause, criminal bribery is
18 See Appendix.
119Id.
120 Id.
121 See Lowenstein, supra note 112, at 826 ("It is widely believed, at least among "sophisticated"
observers of American politics, that explicit quid pro quo arrangements involving specific, identified
official actions, such as legislative votes, given in exchange for campaign contributions, are rare. While
this view may be too optimistic, it is unquestionably true that such arrangements are regarded as bad
form, and it is difficult to discover or assemble direct proof of their existence when they do occur.").
122 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. I (specifying that elected representatives "shall in all Cases, except
Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their attendance at the Session
of their Respective Houses, and in going to and from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either
House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place").
123 442 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1979).
124 Id. at 488.
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exceptionally hard to prove in Congress, and thus offers cold comfort as a
policing mechanism on Capitol Hill. Second, current campaign finance law,
as articulated by the McCutcheon plurality, does not endorse Justice
Thomas' "regulate bribery and no more" position anyway. Instead,
campaign finance regulation has a function separate and apart from criminal
bribery. Corruption's yardstick must perforce be less exacting than that of
criminal bribery. Something less must suffice.
C. Corruption Requires Neither a Bad Policy Outcome nor Causation
Campaign finance laws regulate campaign contributions on anti-
corruption grounds, yet the Court has not defined corruption itself, beyond
limiting it to quidpro quo corruption. The closest it gets to a definition is
when it describes that the "Latin phrase captures the notion of a direct
exchange of an official act for money." '125 Moreover, as discussed above,
the plurality recognizes the special danger that direct campaign
contributions-as opposed to expenditures-pose. 12 6 The plurality states
that "Buckley made clear that the risk of corruption arises when an individual
makes large contributions to the candidate or officeholder himself."' 27 It
adds that quid pro quo corruption occurs when "[e]lected officials are
influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of
financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns" and
that Buckley's concerns "relate[ ] to the perception of undue influence of
large contributors to a candidate.' 28 As the McCutcheon dissenters point
out, such occasions are a "subversion of the political process."1 29
So, even if not bribery, is the story of the SecondMarket employee
campaign contributions enough to suggest quid pro quo corruption? To
make that case this Article must first attempt to define quid pro quo
corruption itself. As Professor Teachout observes, quid pro quo has no
definite meaning, either in the context of constitutional or criminal law. 130
Its origins as a legal term lie in the law of contracts.' 3 ' This Article argues
that in the context of campaign finance, quid pro quo corruption requires
25 McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014).
1
26 /d. at 1452.
1
27 1d. at 1460.
1
2 8 1d at 1461.
9 Id. at 1468 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (citing Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985)).
"' See Zephyr Teachout, McCutcheon and the Meaning of Corruption: Not All Quid Pro Quos are
Made of the Same Stuff, Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2387041 at 12 (Jan. 20, 2014),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2387 041.
131 ld.
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that a campaign contribution or promise of one shortly thereafter precipitates
legislative action of some kind.
Two problems present themselves. First, the two early SecondMarket
employee donations are not the large contributions that most of the Court's
language warns about. This Article will defer discussion until Part III below
as to whether making donations in small dollar amounts should be enough
to cleanse the taint of corruption. The second problem is that it is not clear
that the legislators' actions are "contrary to the obligations of their offices"
or "not on the merits."' 32
There are two distinct but related versions of this argument: corruption
only occurs if(l) the action is against the public interest, or (2) the legislators
in question were not already inclined toward introducing this legislation; in
other words, corruption only takes place when, but for the donation,
legislators would have acted in a contrary manner. This Article rejects both
arguments for reasons that bear elaboration.
The first argument boils down to the point that raising Section 12(g)'s
registration threshold to 2000 accredited investors was good policy-or at
the very least, not demonstrably bad policy. Who knows what number of
shareholders merits forcing public disclosure upon a private corporation?
Five hundred, 2000, or 5000 may well be the best choice. Yet in McConnell
the Court found "[j]ust as troubling to a functioning democracy as classic
quidpro quo corruption is the danger that officeholders will decide issues
not on the merits or the desires of their constituencies, but according to the
wishes of those who have made large financial contributions valued by the
officeholder."' 33
But how do we decide whether legislators have acted "not on the merits?"
After all, the electorate place disparate expectations on legislators. What is
more, reasonable people can and do-to say the least-have genuine
disagreements on the merits of most political issues. Thus, such urges to
"pure" decision-making on the merits are Platonic ideals, better suited for
philosophy than politics, because one cannot speak of "deciding on the
merits" without a clear idea of what the merits are.
But if we cannot evaluate the quality of the legislative end-product, we
might still be able to evaluate the purity of means. As Professor Lowenstein
points out, "even if the policy outcomes are good ones, corruption impairs
32 McCutcheon at 1460-61 (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985)); see also McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 153,
(2003), overruledby Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, (2010).
" McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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the benefits that citizens obtain from participation in politics."134 A pure end
cannot justify a corrupt means, nor can it cleanse it from corruption. "Bought
sex is not the same;"' 35 neither is bought legislative decision-making, even
if the ultimate decisions make for good policy.
But determining what constitutes "bought legislative decision-making"
poses serious problems of its own, as the case of Section 12(g) reveals. In
particular, Representative Schweikert is a Republican. Thus, one can expect
him to be pro-business and anti-regulation. He may well have introduced
H.R. 2167 regardless of the $1000 contribution from SecondMarket's CEO
that came his way the day before. Indeed, he might not even have known of
this very recent donation.
This second argument amounts to requiring that the contribution be a "but
for" cause of political action: but for the campaign contribution, the action
would not have occurred. Just because one event followed another closely
in time, does not mean that the first event caused the second--or as the post
hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy more succinctly puts it, "after this, therefore
because this." Yet there is no but-for causation requirement in quidpro quo
corruption that the politician change position or act counter to how his or her
"true" beliefs would otherwise counsel. Such a requirement has never
existed. It would exclude all but the most overt cases of corruption, since
most donors, in seeking potential targets to sway with money, will turn to
those already ideologically sympathetic to their cause. Moreover, it would
be impossible to implement in practice, since it would require a reliable way
to discern what a legislator "truly" believed. The phrase "quid pro quo
corruption" does not require one to act against one's belief-it merely
requires the reasonable appearance of a bargained-for exchange. 136
Because the quid pro quo concept has its roots in contract,'37 it seems
fitting to turn to that doctrine for enlightenment. The Restatement (2d) of
Contracts tells us that a binding contract requires a bargained-for
exchange.' 38 The comments explain that in the "typical bargain" each side
of the exchange induces the other.'39 The use of the word induces might
seem to suggest that the donation must be the cause of the legislator's action
" Lowenstein, supra note 112, at 805.
135 Id.
' Even the most stringent of quid pro quo corruption definitions in state statutes requires only that
a specific act needs to be alleged to have been obtained or sought. See Teachout, supra note 133, at 13-
14. It does not require a change of heart.
37 
.d at 12.
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981).
"9 Id. at cmt. b.
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to count as quidpro quo. Yet the comment goes on to clarify that "the law
is concerned with the external manifestation rather than the undisclosed
mental state."14 Moreover, Section 81 of the Restatement provides that
what is bargained for need not "of itself' induce the making of a promise or
a performance.14 1  In short, contract doctrine does not require that
consideration be the "true" or even inducing reason for the exchange; instead
it looks to external manifestations that show an intent to induce another to
act. 142
With this notion of the meaning of quid pro quo in mind, debating
whether Schweikert would have introduced H.R. 2167 without the
SecondMarket employee contributions becomes unnecessary. The relevant
point is that appearances matter. The near simultaneity of the donation and
legislative action-particularly given that it was the very first contribution
Silbert had ever made to Schweikert and only the second donation he had
ever made to anyone (except one local New York politician) 143-- creates the
appearance of money inducing legislative action.
The appearance of corruption does considerable work in a world where
corruption must be quidpro quo; what makes a qualifying exchange can be
hard to pin down, particularly when motives are usually opaque. Thus the
next topic, the appearance of corruption, is a vital one.
D. The "Appearance of Corruption" is Enough
The plurality in McCutcheon recited without elaborating the standard
formulation that campaign finance regulation may target not only corruption
but also the appearance of corruption. Indeed, it endorsed this idea in various
phrasings no less than eight times. 44  The dissent, too, invoked the
"" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. b (1981).
141 Id. § 81 (1981).
142 Another bedrock contracts principle is that courts do not inquire into the adequacy of
consideration. See 3 Williston on Contracts § 7.21 (4th ed. 2014) ("It is an elementary and oft quoted
principle that the law will not inquire into the adequacy of consideration as long as the consideration is
otherwise valid or sufficient to support a promise."). To do so would be to attempt to value the benefit
of the legislative action to the donor, a fool's errand. One could attempt to place a value on raising the
shareholder threshold to the CEO of SecondMarkct, attempting to quantify the current law's effect on its
business, and the amount of Silbert's interest in the company, discounting by the probability that such
legislation would actually pass, and the probability that Schweikert would have introduced the bill
anyway, and then compare that number to S 1000. That way madness surely lies.
143 Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECTION COMM'N,
http://www.fec.gov/financc/disclosure/advindsca.shtml (search "Individual Name" field for "Silbert,
Barry").
144 See McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) ("Our cases have held
that Congress may regulate campaign contributions to protect against corruption or the appearance of
corruption.); id. at 1445 ("Congress was justified in concluding that the interest in safeguarding against
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"appearance of corruption" concept. Such appearance, Justice Breyer
reasoned, "can lead the public to believe that its efforts to communicate with
its representatives or to help sway public opinion have little purpose."
14 5
And a cynical public can lose interest in political participation altogether.
Democracy, the Court has often said, cannot work unless "the people have
faith in those who govern."' 146  Appearances matter, to everyone on the
Court.
But in what ways can campaign finance laws address appearances of
corruption? In a related context, Professor Levin has dismissed the objective
of removing the appearance of corruption as "vague and subjective, and ...
also a copout. ' 14 7 He also worries that taking cognizance of this interest
opens the barn door to permitting the most far-reaching legislative
investigations: "In our scandal-oriented political environment, accusations
of wrongdoing can be, and are, leveled at virtually every political candidate
in sight. What fundraising effort is not accused of being unsavory and
making the candidate too beholden to special interests?" 141 Indeed,
legislating on the basis of the appearance of corruption creates the risk of a
self-fulfilling prophecy. As he observes: "[T]he appearances rationale
invites circular reasoning. In effect, it means that the most zealous and
aggressive advocates of restriction can make accusations, whether well
founded in fact or not, and then use the very fact that some people believe
the charges as a reason to justify regulation."' 149
the appearance of impropriety requires that the opportunity for abuse inherent in the process of raising
large monetary contributions be eliminated."); id at 1450 ("This Court has identified only one legitimate
governmental interest for restricting campaign finances: preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption."); id. ("In addition to 'actual quid pro quo arrangements,' Congress may permissibly limit
'the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in
a regime of large individual financial contributions' to particular candidates.") (quoting Buckley v.
Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976)); id. ("When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental
interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro
quo corruption."); id at 1451 ("And because the Government's interest in preventing the appearance of
corruption is equally confined to the appearance of quidpro quo corruption, the Government may not
seek to limit the appearance of mere influence or access."); id. ("The Court in that case upheld base
contribution limits because they targeted 'the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements' and 'the
impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness' of such a system of unchecked
direct contributions.") (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27); id. at 1459 ("[Disclosure requirements] may
also 'deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and
expenditures to the light of publicity."') (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67).
141 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467.
" Id. at 1468 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364
U.S. 520, 562 (1961)).
' Ronald M. Levin, Fighting the Appearance of Corruption, 6 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 171, 174
(2001).
148 Id. at 177.
14 9 Id. at 178.
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Yet today's Court clearly thinks that appearances matter and are an
appropriate target of regulation:
Leave the perception of impropriety unanswered, and the
cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could
jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in
democratic governance. Democracy works only if the
people have faith in those who govern, and that faith is
bound to be shattered when high officials and their
appointees engage in activities which arouse suspicions of
malfeasance and corruption. 1 50
The danger of the appearance of corruption in this reasoning is that it will
force people to lose faith in the entire democratic system. '5'
But what constitutes corruption is difficult to articulate or pin down.
Levin argues:
At a time when many people casually speak of the entire
Congress as corrupt, a guideline that looks to maintaining
public confidence in Congress can scarcely be applied at
face value. Nor would such a straightforward application be
desirable, because popular attitudes toward Congress often
suffer from misinformation, unrealistic expectations, and
failure to appreciate the tradeoffs that legislators must make
among their constituents' many incompatible demands. 1 52
Levin's point is well-taken: attempts to apply the "appearance of
corruption" standard in practice seem perilous because corruption is in the
eye of the beholder.
"'0 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000) (citing United States v. Miss. Valley
Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562 (1961)).
' Zephyr Teachout characterizes this as the idea that the appearance of corruption has a "dispiriting
impact" on the public. Teachout, supra note 114, at 394-95. She identifies two forms of this argument:
"In the strong form of this view--which few Justices take--the real problem with corruption is that voters
will stop voting, people will stop running for office, and citizens will stop making serious efforts to read
the news and understand the public issues of their day, because they will believe that such efforts are
futile. In the weak form, public perceptions are a secondary concern. However, the weak form has a
hydraulic power of its own, mostly because evidentiary issues seem much easier when 'appearance of
corruption' instead of corruption itself needs to be measured, and so this concern allows for Justices to
insert their own intuitions about actual corruption into the appearance framework." Id. at 395..
'52 Ronald M. Levin, Congressional Ethics and Constituent Advocacy in an Age of Mistrust, 95
MICH. L. REV. I, 100 (1996).
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Even so, the language must mean something, especially when it has made
the point over and over again. In short, there must be some circumstances
where the appearance of corruption is enough to turn the judicial analysis;
otherwise, the words of the Court are mere superfluity or platitudes.
153
This Article has made the case that SecondMarket employee
contributions raise the appearance of quidpro quo corruption. If anything is
to qualify as the appearance of quid pro quo corruption by the logic of
McCutcheon, these payments-separated from a favorable outcome for the
donor by mere weeks and, in one case, one day-must qualify. The timing
is too tight.
One might object that the circumstances of the June 13 donation -which
was made one day before Rep. Schweikert introduced H.R. 2167--do not
suggest corruption. The bill as introduced contained only 346 words;' 54 it
does not appear to be a "rush job." It addresses three separate provisions of
the Exchange Act and contains a detailed revised definition. 5 5 In sum, it is
a well thought-out, if targeted, piece of legislation. Such proposals are not
born overnight.
But this fact is precisely what suggests that untoward coordination may
have occurred. SecondMarket might well have consulted with
Representative Schweikert's staff for some time on the wording of this piece
of legislation. Indeed, Representative Schweikert may not even have known
about SecondMarket's timely donation. But the fact that the donation
' But see Stephcn M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way
Everybody Else Does-Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 143
(2002) ("[T]he model implies that lower courts should treat Supreme Court rulings in the securities area
with a grain of salt."); Richard P. Campbell, The Protective Order in Products Liability Litigation:
Safeguard or Misnomer?, 31 B.C. L. REV. 771, 798 (1990) ("Other courts, however, have shown a
hesitancy to interpret the Supreme Court's words literally."); Wing H. Liang, Honeywell: The Straw That
May Just Break the Inventor's Back, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2655, 2695 (2005) ("One commentator,
Werner H. Sterner, argues that the Supreme Court's words should not be read so literally so as to extend
presumptive prosecution history estoppel to all situations where a new element was added by amendment
because both Justice Thomas in Werner-Jenkinson and Justice Kennedy in Festo H used the terms "new
element" and "new limitation" relatively loosely."); Margaret Meriwethcr Cordray & Richard Cordray,
The Calendar of the Justices: How the Supreme Court's Timing Affects Its Decisionmaking, 36 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 183, 215-16 (2004) ("Judge Richard Posner, for example, has documented how the length of
Supreme Court opinions has expanded since the 1960s, and he opines that '[miodem federal judicial
opinions bristle with superfluities."'); Martin A. Schwartz, Lawrence v. Texas: The Decision and Its
Implications for the Future, 20 TOURO L. REV. 221, 247 (2004) ("The Supreme Court's decision in
Turner v. Safley is filled with all kinds of platitudes about marriage .... ); Mark Wankum, Standing in
the Way of Clarity: Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 30 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
515 (2008) ("In the waning days of the 2006 Term, the Supreme Court published a series of fractured
and controversial decisions, filled with fiery constitutional platitudes and passionate dissents.").
"5 Private Company Flexibility and Growth Act, H.R. 2167, 112th Cong. (2011), available at
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/i 12/hr2167/text/ih..155 Id.
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occurred the day before the bill's introduction creates the appearance, at
least, that even if it was not a but-for cause, the donation played some role.
To sum up, the SecondMarket employee donations are among the most
obvious imaginable examples of the form of campaign contribution that
could appear corrupt. Yet some might remain skeptical that such small
amounts of money--despite being the coin of the campaign finance realm-
could influence legislation. Empirical research from the social sciences
suggests that even small-dollar gifts can inspire feelings of obligation in the
recipient. 156
E. The Reciprocity Principle and the Power of Small Gifts
Through behavioral experiments and by observing real-life sales tactics,
the social science literature has elucidated the reciprocity principle: receipt
of a gift triggers in the recipient a perceived obligation to reciprocate.157
Research in a variety of disciplines suggests that small gifts raise large
conflicts of interest.
Psychologist Robert Cialdini describes an early and oft-cited experiment
involving a subject and a research assistant (posing as a fellow subject,
shorthanded as "Joe") rating paintings for what was ostensibly an art
appreciation study.'58 In some cases, Joe offered the subject an unsolicited
favor: he left the room and returned, saying "I asked [the experimenter] if I
could get myself a Coke, and he said it was OK, so I bought one for you,
too."'1 59 In the other cases, he left the room and returned empty-handed. 60
At the end of the session, Joe asked the subject to buy raffle tickets at 25
cents apiece, for a $50 prize: "Any would help, the more the better."' 6' The
subjects who received the soda bought twice as many tickets as those who
did not. 162
156 A.W. Gouldncr, The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement. 25 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL
REV., 161, 171 (1960).
157 ld.
' See ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 22 (2001) (discussing the original
study, R.T. Regan, Effects of a Favor and Liking on Compliance, 7 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 627,
627-39 (1971)). For other references, see, e.g., Hasen, supra note 19, at 221, n. 183 (citing same); Thomas
M. Susman, Private Ethics, Public Conduct: An Essay on Ethical Lobbying, Campaign Contributions,
Reciprocity, and the Public Good, 19 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 10, 16 (2008); Thomas M. Susman,
Lobbying in the 21" Century-Reciprocity and the Needfor Reform, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 737, 748 (2006).
"9 R.T. Regan, Effects of a Favor and Liking on Compliance, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
627, 631 (1971)).
160 id.
161 ld at 632.
162 CIALDINI, supra note 180, at 22.
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A similar study showed that providing diners with a "fancy, foil wrapped
piece of chocolate" (to differentiate from the cheap mints that restaurants
more customarily provide) increased the amount of tips servers received. 163
To counter the self-evident objection that chocolate makes people feel better,
and thus more generous, in one variation the server gave each customer a
chance to select a piece of candy and then, seemingly spontaneously,
stopped to allow each diner to select a second one. 164  Percentage tips
increased with the chocolate, but more with the "spontaneous" gift. ' 65
Cialdini describes this "rule of reciprocation" as possessing "awesome
strength,"'' 66 observing that "[b]ecause there is a general distaste for those
who take and make no effort to give in return, we will often go to great
lengths to avoid being considered a moocher, ingrate, or [freeloader]."' 167 He
attributes to the reciprocity principle the success of Hare Krishnas in
soliciting money from strangers after first pressing upon them a flower,168
the inclusion of an unsolicited gift of pre-printed individualized address
labels, 169 and the use of free samples in supermarkets. 7 0
There are suggestions that the reciprocity principle, so strong in the lab
and in daily life, also affects Washington politics. Cialdini attributes Lyndon
Johnson's success in getting programs through Congress to the many favors
he had provided to legislators while in the House and Senate-and the
problems Jimmy Carter suffered to his "Washington outsider" status. 7' He
had no favors on which to cash in.
Capitol Punishment, the memoir of disgraced lobbyist Jack Abramoff,
likewise details a world where reciprocity-by way of campaign
contributions and favors-is the order of the day. He recounts a scene in
which then-Majority Whip Tom DeLay explained to Microsoft the
importance of campaign contributions:
One of the Microsoft executives firmly brushed off his
solicitation, prompting DeLay to deliver a stem message.
When he was a freshman in Congress, he told them he
163 David B. Strohmetz et al., Sweetening the Till: The Use of Candy to Increase Restaurant Tipping,
32 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 300, 302-03 (2002).
6i Id. at 303.
165 Id. at 305-06.
66 
CIALDINI, supra note 161, at 22.
1
67
1 Id. at 21.
'68 See id at 24-25.
169 See id at 29.
17o See id. at 26-27.
171 See id. at 25-26.
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approached Walmart for a campaign contribution. The
government affairs director of Walmart told him that
Walmart didn't like to "sully their hands" with political
involvement. Staring intently at the Microsoft executives,
DeLay continued: "A year later, that government affairs rep
was in my office asking me to intervene to get an exit built
from the federal highway adjacent to a new Walmart store.
I told him I didn't want to sully my hands with such a task.
You know what? They didn't get their ramp. You know
what else? They will never get that ramp."'
72
According to Abramoff, Microsoft soon delivered the Republican
Congressional Committee a $100,000 check. 173 Of course, $100,000 is not
$5200-but it was the product of individual donations of made to the
Microsoft PAC. 174  Moreover, Abramoff, an individual unique in being
positioned to have seen the inner workings of Capitol Hill and-by dint of
his criminal convictions-having nothing to lose by being candid, reflected
that such payments, while legal, negatively affected the legislative
process. 175 He extols the power of "baubles and trinkets," including sports
and concert tickets to generate favorable treatment by legislators.
Abramoff's baubles thus provide an example of the power of the reciprocity
principle at work on Capitol Hill.'76
Interestingly, Abramoff ends his memoir by calling on an outright ban on
lobbyists' contributing "so much as one dollar" to elected officials, and on
gift-giving entirely: "[n]o finger food, no snacks, no hot dogs. Nothing."'1 77
III. THE BASE LIMITS ARE A COMPROMISE, NOT A SAFE HARBOR
The McCutcheon plurality conceives of the base limits as a safe harbor;
in effect, it posits that contributions are unproblematic so long as they do not
exceed $5200.178 But in the same breath it takes a position that almost
guarantees that corruption will occur within the base limits: Citizens
172 JACK ABRAMOFF, CAPITOL PUNISHMENT 65 (2011).
173 Id.
" Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECTION COMM'N,
http://www.fec.gov/financc/disclosure/advindsea.shtml (search "Employer/Occupation" field for
"Microsoft").
175 See ABRAMOFF, supra note 175, at 90.
17 6 See id. at 162-63.
171 Id. at 273.
178 McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014).
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United's proposition that the stark creation of access and gratitude does not
equal corruption or even the appearance of corruption.17 9 In this I explore
and debunk this idea first, demonstrating the ultimate futility of parsing the
difference between gratitude, access, and corruption. Armed with this
insight, I then criticize in greater detail McCutcheon's unrealistic view of
the base limits as an effective safeguard against corruption.
A. If "Gratitude and Access" Are Not Corruption, Then the Base Limits
Demarcate What Will Always be a Fuzzy Line
The McCutcheon plurality was at pains to make clear that gratitude and
access do not count as corruption, citing crucial language from Citizens
United: "[G]overnment regulation may not target the general gratitude a
candidate may feel toward those who support him or his allies, or the
political access such support may afford."' 80 Instead, "[t]hey embody a
central feature of democracy-that constituents support candidates who
share their beliefs and interests, and candidates who are elected can be
expected to be responsive to those concerns."''
The plurality goes so far as to assert that responsiveness lies at the very
heart of democracy:
For the past 40 years, our campaign finance jurisprudence
has focused on the need to preserve authority for the
Government to combat corruption, without at the same time
compromising the political responsiveness at the heart of
the democratic process, or allowing the Government to
favor some participants in that process over others. 82
It cites Edmund Burke for the proposition that "a representative owes
constituents the exercise of his 'mature judgment,' but that this judgment
should be informed by 'the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and
the most unreserved communication with his constituents. '183
While constituents may not (to use the dissent's language) deploy money
to "call the tune"' 84 for representatives, politicians nevertheless "can be
expected to be cognizant of and responsive to [contributors'] concerns. Such
'7 Id. at 360 (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010)).
180 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441.
I8 ld.
18 2 Id. at 1461.
183 Id. (citing THE SPEECHES OF THE RIGHT HON. EDMUND BURKE 129-130 (J. Burke ed. 1867).
" Id. at 1468 (quoting majority in Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S 377 (2000).
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responsiveness is key to the very concept of self-governance through elected
officials.' ' 85 Thus, the justices of the plurality believe that one can in
practice distinguish between corruption-defined as quid pro quo
corruption-and those unobjectionable payments that merely secure access
to a legislator or convey gratitude for a position taken.
When the McCutcheon plurality intoned that "government regulation
may not target the general gratitude a candidate may feel toward those who
support him or his allies, or the political access such support may afford,"'186
it invoked an idea previously recognized by the Court. The Citizens United
Court declared that "[i]ngratiation and access . . . are not corruption."'1 87
What is more, this idea has a long lineage. Professor Lowenstein observed
in 1985 that "[e]ven defenders of special interest contributions do not
generally deny that such contributions are intended to influence official
actions. The most common assertion is that a contributor to a legislator seeks
nothing more for the contribution than assured access to a legislator when
important issues arise."' 88 (Lowenstein also wryly noted that "[n]o evidence
is cited to support this assertion of universal self-restraint on the part of
special interest campaign contributors.")' 89
Threading the line between permissible influence and impermissible
corruption is a difficult one for a simple reason: the defenders of such
contributions cannot deny that donors' payments are getting them
something. Special interest groups of all stripes make donations all the time,
and presumably they are not all eleemosynarians. But self-serving motives
are fine according to the McCutcheon plurality as long as the donor is not
trying to "control the exercise of an officeholder's official duties .... [M]ere
influence or access" is acceptable, as are their appearance. 190
Finally, the plurality makes clear that, even if the line between verboten
corruption and non-verboten influence is difficult to draw, when it comes to
the First Amendment rights of the donor versus the possibility of corruption,
any tie goes to the donor: "The line between quidpro quo corruption and
general influence may seem vague at times, but the distinction must be
respected in order to safeguard basic First Amendment rights."' 9' Thus,
' McCutcheon, 134 S. CL at 1462.
'Id., 134 S. Ct. at 1441.
C8 itizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010).
's Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L.
REV. 784, 827 (1985).
189 Id.
" McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450-51.
191 Id. at 1451.
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"[i]n drawing that line, the First Amendment requires us to err on the side of
protecting political speech rather than suppressing it."
192
In the McCutcheon plurality's view, a heightened responsiveness to
donors is a good thing.' 93 But the unstated cost of access is its flipside: the
diminished voice of non-donors. As Professor Vincent Blasi observes,
campaign finance restrictions have created a world that pressures
candidates' time in a manner that leaves little room for general constituent
service. 194 Candidates spend massive blocks of time "dialing for donors"-
if not for themselves, then for other party members.' 
95
So, how to analyze the most problematic payments made by
SecondMarket and Wawa employees, in light of McCutcheon's teachings on
ingratiation and access? The $11,000 donations of Wawa employees to
Senator Toomey, which occurred months after the JOBS Act's passage,
196
can readily be categorized as gratitude payments. But in the Court's
language, gratitude is for the candidate; donors seek ingratiation and access.
After-the-fact donor payments don't readily fit within the established
framework.
Perhaps if candidates can permissibly express gratitude, then so too can
donors. But does this way of thinking about things solve the corruption
problem, or merely sweep it under the rug? How can an outside observer
differentiate "gratitude" from a relationship-strengthening tit-for-tat corrupt
payment? Put crudely, is donor gratitude simply corruption's deferred
payment plan?
Consider the most notable SecondMarket employee contributions. The
first involved Representative Himes' introduction of a bill requesting a study
of appropriate shareholder registration thresholds."' Within two weeks,
SecondMarket's CEO and head of public affairs each donated $1000 to
Himes, neither having donated to another out-of-state politician before. This
behavior might look like just the sort of quidpro quo style corruption--or
at least its appearance-as to trigger concern. Yet could the Court dismiss
'Id. at 1451 (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449,457 (2007)).
'9' McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441.
'9 Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund - Raising: Why Campaign Spending
Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1282-83 (1994).
19 Ezra Klein, The Most Depressing Graphic for Members of Congress, Washington Post (Jan. 13,
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/4/the-most-depressing-graphic-
for-members-of-congress/.
" Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECTION COMM'N,
http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/advindsca.shtm (search "Employer/Occupation" field for "Wawa")
(showing five Wawa employees contributed $1000 to Friends of Pat Toomey on June 27, 2012 and one
Wawa employee made two $2500 contributions on June 27, 2012).
197 H.R. 1965, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2011).
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these payments as mere manifestations of gratitude? Where is the evidence
of any attempt to influence action-especially when that action has already
occurred? And even assuming there is an attempt to influence a
representative, why not conclude the only goal is to secure access to the
Representative as the bill winds its way through Congress? The line here
seems "vague" to the point of dissolving into mystery. The donation could
fairly be characterized as either having the appearance of a quidpro quo or
constituting only a bid for influence and access.
The second payment occurred when SecondMarket's CEO Barry Silbert
donated $1000 to Representative Schweikert and the next day, Schweikert
introduced a bill proposing to raise the shareholder threshold. '98 This Article
presumes that "access" in the context of campaign finance means the
opportunity to make one's policy case to an elected official, perhaps
repeatedly over time. If this donation merely granted Silbert "access" to
Schweikert, it was clearly money well spent, since the access it procured
translated overnight into legislative action.199 "Access" might be viewed a
different way-that is, as access to the bill's sponsor as the bill moved
through Congress, including in both the short and the long term. Or we might
characterize the $1000 as an expression of gratitude for what Schweikert
was then about to do. Such characterizations, however, work the trick of
rendering all contributions mere expressions of gratitude or quests for access
in a way that makes issues of apparent or actual corruption a defacto empty
set.
As stated in the prior section, if anything is going to count as the
appearance of corruption-defined as quidpro quo-then it must be these
payments. Yet the permissible securing of access and gratitude are malleable
enough concepts to apply even in extreme cases like these. The plurality's
distinctions collapse in practice. The plurality calls the line separating quid
pro quo corruption from permissible influence "vague."200 But there is
reason to wonder whether there is any line at all.
B. McCutcheon's Impoverished View of the Base Limits
The McCutcheon plurality's view is that the base limits represent a safe
harbor from the tempest of corruption. 20 1 "Base limits" refers to the
maximum a giver can donate to a single candidate. 2 2 Originally $1000 in
198 H.R. 2167, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2011).
199 Id
20 McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1451 (2014).
201 Id. at 1442
202 id. at 1443.
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the FECA,2 ° 3 they have been adjusted for inflation. At the time of the JOBS
Act's passage they were $2500204 and are currently $2600 ($5200 for
combined primary and general elections). 20 5
Buckley approved the constitutionality of base limits. It alo approved
(albeit in only "one paragraph" as the McCutcheon plurality points out)
FECA's limitation on how much a donor could give in the aggregate to all
candidates during a single election cycle.20 6 McCutcheon's holding
overturned the aggregate limits, and in doing so both affirmed the
constitutionality of the base limits 2 7 and repeatedly discounted the
corrupting potential of relatively small dollar values. 20 8
The plurality knows how much money matters to Congress: $5000, even
$26,000, is not enough.20 9  For example, the plurality scoffed about the
hypothetical contortions the dissent employed to justify the aggregate limits,
noting "on a more basic level, it is hard to believe that a rational actor would
engage in such machinations. In the example described, a dedicated donor
spent $500,000--donating the full $5,000 to 100 different PACs-to add
just $26,000 to Smith's campaign coffers. '2 10 Later it pooh-poohs $5000:
"It might be that such guilty knowledge could not be shown because the
donors were not guilty-a possibility that the dissent does not entertain. In
any event, the donors described in those eight cases were typically alleged
to have exceeded the base limits by $5,000 or less." '' The plurality implies
that sums this small will not drive a senator or representative to act. And if
that is so, donations under the $5200 legal cap should pose no cause for
concern at all.
As the Buckley Court analyzed the constitutionality of limiting direct
contributions to candidates, it repeatedly emphasized the evidence Congress
23 Anthony Johnstone, Recalibrating Campaign Finance Law, 32 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 217, 232
(2013).
204Id.
205 McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014).
'06 See id at 1437 (2014) ("After doing so, the Court devoted only one paragraph of its 139-pagc
opinion to the aggregate limit then in place under FECA, noting that the provision "ha[d] not been
separately addressed at length by the parties.").
2o7 See id at 1458 ("It is worth keeping in mind that the base limits themselves are a prophylactic
measure. As we have explained, 'restrictions on direct contributions arc preventative, because few ifany
contributions to candidates will involve quid pro quo arrangements.' The aggregate limits are then
layered on top, ostensibly to prevent circumvention of the base limits.") (internal citations omitted).
2o. Id. at 1446.
109 Id. at 1457.
2
' Id. at 1454 (emphasis added).
2. Id. at 1456 (emphasis added).
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had assembled of problematically large donations. It cited to the Court of
Appeals opinion, which detailed:
Congress and the public had become informed of the
various aspects of the 1972 campaign. Revelations of huge
contributions from the dairy industry, a number of
corporations (illegally) and ambassadors and potential
ambassadors, made the 1972 election a watershed for public
confidence in the electoral system .... After extensive
investigation, Congress concluded that such corrupt and
pernicious practices are more likely to occur when there are
no effective limits on amount of campaign expenditure. In
short, big-spending campaigns pull like a magnetic field.2 12
Building on this idea, the Court in Buckley concluded that "[t]o the extent
that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from
current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of
representative democracy is undermined. '21 3
It might be said that this quotation indicates that Buckley sought to restrict
only "large contributions." But following Buckley, the Court did not hesitate
to endorse limits on small contributions-even those under than the base
limits. 21 4 For example, in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC the
Court upheld state limits even lower than $1000, and citing Buckley as
rejecting the idea that any amount was "a constitutional minimum below
which legislatures could not regulate."215 The question instead was:
2"2 Buckley v. Valco, 519 F.2d 821, 839-40 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (per curiam). The findings
are quite suggestive ofquidpro quo corruption. See id at 839 n.36 ("Looming large in the perception of
the public and Congressmen was the revelation conceming the extensive contributions by dairy
organizations to Nixon fund raisers, in order to gain a meeting with White House officials on price
supports. The industry pledged $2,000,000 to the 1972 campaign, a pledge known to various White
House officials, with President Nixon informed directly by Charles Colson in September 1970, as
acknowledged by the 1974 White House paper .... On March 23, 1971, after a meeting with dairy
organization representatives, President Nixon decided to overrule the decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture and to increase price supports. In the meetings and calls that immediately followed the
internal White House discussion and preceded the public announcement two days later, culminating in a
meeting held by Herbert Kalmbach at the direction of John Ehrlichman, the dairymen were informed of
the likelihood of an imminent increase and of the desire that they reaffirm their $2 million pledge."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
21 Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976) (per curiam).
214 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S 377 (2000).
211 Id.at 397.
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[W]hether the contribution limitation was so radical in
effect as to render political association ineffective, drive the
sound of a candidate's voice below the level of notice, and
render contributions pointless. Such being the test, the issue
in later cases cannot be truncated to a narrow question about
the power of the dollar, but must go to the power to mount
a campaign with all the dollars likely to be forthcoming.
216
Thus, Nixon signals that the amount of base limits may be low-even far
lower than the federal base limits-as long as the candidates still have an
effective voice.
Professor Teachout observes, "[t]he more politics looks like a store,
where actions can be bought, the more corrupt it is." 217 In effect, the FECA
slashed the prices in the congressional store. The story is a classic one of
supply and demand, as Professors Issacharoff and Karlan have observed:
As in all markets in which demand runs high but supply is
limited, the value of the good rises. In campaigns, the result
is an unceasing preoccupation with fundraising. The effect
is much like giving a starving man unlimited trips to the
buffet table but only a thimble-sized spoon with which to
eat: chances are great that the constricted means to satisfy
his appetite will create a singular obsession with
consumption. If candidates are unable to rely on large
contributions, the rather predictable outcome is that they
will spend all their time having to chase smaller
contributions to fill their giant-sized appetites ... 
2 8
And if the currency by which donors can seek gratitude and access is
confined by the base limits, then presumably donations under those limits
can amount to impermissible quidpro quo corruption. As Teachout points
out, federal criminal law prohibits giving something of value in exchange
for official action. 219 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act defines corruption
as "an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of
216 Id.
217 Teachout, supra note 102, at 388.
211 Samuel lssacharoff& Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX.
L. REV. 1705, 1710-11 (1999).
219 See Teachout, supra note 150, at 29.
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any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of
anything of value."220 There is no safe harbor for payments under $5200.
The plurality in McCutcheon asserts that a safe harbor does exist-that
there is no risk of corruption or its appearance under the base limits.
Consider this passage:
Of course a candidate would be pleased with a donor who
contributed not only to the candidate himself, but also to
other candidates from the same party, to party committees,
and to PACs supporting the party. But there is a clear,
administrable line between money beyond the base limits
funneled in an identifiable way to a candidate-for which
the candidate feels obligated-and money within the base
limits given widely to a candidate's party-for which the
candidate, like all other members of the party, feels
grateful.2"'
In the plurality's view, a candidate would feel obligation for money
beyond the base limits-but presumably not for money within those limits.
It is unclear why this should be the case, particularly given that the law
makes those smaller contributions quite valuable-precisely because the
larger ones are illegal.
222
C. In Reality, the Base Limits Are no Safe Harbor-Especially in Areas of
Low Salience
The argument thus far leads to one conclusion: contrary to the
McCutcheon plurality's assertion, quid pro quo corruption---or at least a
"cognizable risk of corruption--does sometimes exist below the base limits.
The campaign contributions of SecondMarket employees were all perfectly
legal-indeed, well below the base limits for individual candidates. Yet the
timing and pattern of donation-in the first instance, to representatives
within days of introducing favorable legislation-create at least the
appearance of corruption. Corruption requires less than bribery, and even
McCutcheon's quidpro quo corruption does not require but-for causation.
In short, the contribution of SecondMarket's CEO need not have caused
220 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (2014) (emphasis added).
2' McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1461 (2014) (emphasis added).
Indeed, they may increase the likelihood of corruption. See Philip M. Nichols, The Perverse Effect
of Campaign Contribution Limits: Reducing the Allowable Amounts Increases the Likelihood of
Corruption in the Federal Legislature, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 77, 109-10 (2011).
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Representative Schweikert to introduce legislation; the appearance of
corruption is enough to justify the ban.
Moreover, other data support the idea that even comparatively low-dollar
contributions can create a predisposition to reciprocate on the part of the
recipient.223 Psychologists have noted this reciprocity principle in a number
of settings, and it explains a variety of fundraising and sales tactics. 22 4 No
one likes to be a "moocher," and anecdotal evidence from lobbyist
Abramoff s memoir reflects the common understanding of the importance
of favors on Capitol Hill.
225
The story of Section 12(g)'s campaign contributions could mean several
things for base limits themselves. If the donations detailed here qualify as
quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, then Congress may have set its
number too high. Indeed, it may be that the very idea of base limits is
doomed to failure because, by virtue of limiting the amount of any individual
contribution, smaller dollar contributions take on greater campaign value.
The story of Section 12(g) may also support a more nuanced view of base
limits. Professor Hasen, for example, has made the following observations
with regard to lobbying:
Lobbyists rarely can sway resistant legislators on high-
salience issues about which the public appears to be paying
a great deal of attention. Birnbaum and Murray, for
example, describe in painstaking detail how even the most
highly paid professional lobbyists were unable to derail a
large corporate tax increase which became part of the
politically popular Tax Reform Act of 1986, a major tax bill
passed during the Reagan Administration with bipartisan
support . . . . Rather than working primarily to change
legislative minds on issues of high public salience,
lobbyists, like mushrooms, thrive in areas of low light. As
Birnbaum and Murray show, once it became apparent that
the 1986 tax bill was going to pass, lobbyists were much
more successful in working to get favorable treatment for
223 ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 26-27 (2001) (discussing the original
study, Singer, Van Holwyk & Maher, Experiments with Incentives in Telephone Surveys, 64 PUB. UP. Q,
177-81 (2000); and James & Bolstein, Effect of Monetary Incentives and Follow-up Mailings on the
Response Rate and Response Quality in Mail Surveys. 54 PUB. Op. Q, 442-53 (1992)).
224 Id.
22' ABRAMOFF, supra note 175, at 65.
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their clients in the details of the bill and its
implementation.
226
We can tell a similar story with regard to campaign contributions. If a
politician is campaigning on gun rights and has considerable NRA support,
a mere $5200 donation is not going to tempt her to deviate from that position.
But on laws regarding issues to which most politicians, their constituents
and the general public are relatively indifferent-like securities regulation,
particularly in a time where no scandal has rendered the issue salient-the
price of legislator mind-changing is likely to be much lower. And if
legislators have no clear prior preference on the question of the 500-
shareholder threshold-and it's hard to imagine that they would-then
$5200 could go a long way indeed.
D. The Wobbly-Fulcrum Problem
The McCutcheon plurality, like the majority in Citizens United, purports
to strike a reasoned balance between the speech interests of political donors
and the legitimate government interest in protecting against corruption or its
appearance. It privileges the rights of the individual to "participate in the
public debate through political expression and political association"-
making clear in the next sentence that "[w]hen an individual contributes
money to a candidate, he exercises both of those rights: The contribution
'serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views'
and 'serves to affiliate a person with a candidate.' 22 7
Chief Justice Roberts' opinion expands on the importance of the money-
as-speech interest:
Those First Amendment rights are important regardless
whether the individual is, on the one hand, a "lone
pamphleteer[ ] or street comer orator[ ] in the Tom Paine
mold," or is, on the other, someone who spends "substantial
amounts of money in order to communicate [his] political
ideas through sophisticated" means. Either way, he is
participating in an electoral debate that we have recognized
226 Hasen, supra note 19, at 220-21.
227 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448 (quoting Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1976) (per
curiam)).
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is "integral to the operation of the system of government
established by our Constitution.228
If money-as-speech interests are as paradigmatic as Thomas Paine's in
the context of free speech, and the base limits are "adequate to protect
against corruption," then it logically follows that aggregate limits impose an
undue, and thus unconstitutional, constraint on speech interests.
229
Not surprisingly,Chief Justice Roberts reached exactly this conclusion:
[The aggregate] limits deny the individual all ability to
exercise his expressive and associational rights by
contributing to someone who will advocate for his policy
preferences. A donor must limit the number of candidates
he supports, and may have to choose which of several policy
concerns he will advance--clear First Amendment harms
that the dissent never acknowledges.
It is no answer to say that the individual can simply
contribute less money to more people. To require one
person to contribute at lower levels than others because he
wants to support more candidates or causes is to impose a
special burden on broader participation in the democratic
process. And as we have recently admonished, the
Government may not penalize an individual for "robustly
exercis[ing]" his First Amendment rights. 230
Given the vibrant notion of speech via campaign contributions that Chief
Justice Roberts endorses, the aggregate limits seem ludicrously excessive.
Yet the fulcrum on which this balance is struck is the critical assumption
that the base limits effectively prevent corruption. If this premise is faulty,
then so too is the Chief Justice's rationale and resulting conclusion. In other
words, if base limits are not, in fact, "adequate to protect against corruption,"
then aggregate limits are more properly seen as an important fail-safe than
as a useless redundancy. In that case, McCutcheon has favored money-as-
speech to the detriment of valid anti-corruption interests.
228 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448 (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480,493 (1985)).
229 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448.
231 Id. at 1448-49 (quoting Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 739 (2009)).
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IV. FURTHER LESSONS
In this Article I have focused on demonstrating that, contrary to
MeCutcheon's presumption, the base limits provide no guarantee against
corruption, its risk and its appearance. The plurality's point that "few if any
contributions to candidates will involve quidpro quo arrangements" may be
true; base limits may be over-inclusive. But in other situations, particularly
in areas of low-salience, they may well be under-inclusive as well. This
Part offers a few further points for reflection.
A. A Missed Argument for Aggregate Limits
Everyone involved in McCutcheon-the government, the plurality, and
the dissent-accepted one premise: campaign contributions within the base
limits do not present a "cognizable risk of corruption." The crux of the
dissent's argument was that the aggregate limits prevented circumvention of
the base limits.
The SecondMarket employee contributions suggest that aggregate limits
guard against another danger that is no less salient-the cognizable risk of
corruption within the base limits. Donations of $1000, if occurring in near
conjunction with legislative action, can suggest the existence of a quidpro
quo exchange. If donations smaller than $5200 pose a real threat of
corruption, then the aggregate limits play a significant role: they stand as a
second-line bulwark against corruption. In the pre-McCutcheon world, if a
single donor sought to influence legislation in a corrupt manner, she would
have to choose among ten legislators upon which to bestow her largess.
23
'
Now the field is wide open. Each donor-each employee-can contribute
up to $5200 to each and every member of Congress.
This argument against the aggregate limits is more powerful than the
dissent's failed anti-circumvention rationale. The SecondMarket employee
contributions show that the aggregate limits, far from being prophylaxis-
upon-prophylaxis, function instead as a mitigating principle. If corruption
can occur within the base limits, then limiting the extent of that corruption
becomes a separate and crucial function.
This second line of defense is sorely needed because there is reason to
doubt that any legislative reform will prevent this type of corruption. To the
contrary, as soon as this kind of timing problem is exposed, it will disappear.
If the problem is one of too short an interval of time between contribution
231 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3) (2014), (which set aggregate contribution limits at $57,500).
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and legislative action, then candidates and donors will make sure to observe
a decorous delay between contribution and action.
What this decorous delay accomplishes is a nuanced question. If the
objection to the SecondMarket employee contributions was merely the
unseemliness of the timing, then future donors and donees can solve the
problem simply by waiting. Democracy is no longer undermined because
the corrupt appearances are gone. On the other hand, if the Section 12(g)
story is disquieting because it is an unusually blatant example of troubling
behavior that exists all the time, then a decorous delay just drives
underground quidpro quo corruption that remains objectionable (although
now hidden).
B. The Importance of the Base Limits
Post-McCutcheon, all that remain are the base limits, and these may now
be vulnerable to attack. A prominent election scholar, Richard Hasen, has
suggested that the plurality's cramped definition of corruption could mean
that "many more campaign laws could fall in the near future, including those
base $2,600 limits. '23 2 James L. Buckley, the named plaintiff in Buckley v.
Valeo, recently calculated the prospects of the Roberts Court overturning the
base limits at "50/50. "1233
Some might respond by saying that since the base limits do not prevent
corruption, their elimination would be no great loss. That response would be
a mistake. As Part III of this Article showed, in a world where corruption
means quidpro quo corruption and ingratiation and access are permissible,
corruption is nigh onto impossible to prove. And it was for precisely this
good reason that Buckley v. Valeo upheld base limit restrictions in the first
place. It observed that it was "difficult to isolate suspect contributions.
234
Even more importantly, it added, the "opportunity for abuse inherent in the
process of raising large monetary contributions" was a legitimate
governmental interest.235
Section 12(g) teaches that the base limits are a vital, if imperfect,
safeguard against corruption. Instead of presenting the government with the
232 Richard L. Hascn, Die Another Day: The Supreme Court Takes a Big Step Closer to Gutting the
Last Bits of Campaign Finance Reform, SLATECOM, (Apr. 2, 2014 1:13 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articies/news-andpolitics/jurisprudence/2014/04/the-subtle-awfulness-of the
mccutcheon v fec campaign finance decision thc.html.
233 James Taranto, Nine Decades at the Barricades, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 1, 2014 6:18 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/the-weekend-intcrview-nine-decades-at-the-barricades- 1406931516.
234 Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 30 (1976) (per curiam).
235 Id.
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intractable problem of untangling corruption from access from gratitude,
they allow it to cut the Gordian knot with a simple and readily administrable
prophylactic rule. Without the base limits, the floodgates open.
C. Limits on Corporate Donations
This Article has been at pains to make clear that the donations at issue in
this piece came from individuals who worked for certain corporations-not
from the corporations themselves. Since 1907, federal law has barred
corporations from contributing directly to candidates for federal office. 3 6
As Beaumont stated: "Any attack on the federal prohibition of direct
corporate political contributions goes against the current of a century of
congressional efforts to curb corporations' potentially 'deleterious
influences on federal elections,' which we have canvassed a number of times
before. 237
In 2010 Professor Issacharoff remarked that a logical extension of
Citizens United might be to allow corporations to donate directly to
candidates.23 8 He wrote that:
In endowing corporations with all the prerogatives of
natural persons in terms of independent expenditures, the
logic of the Court's holding could even signal a willingness
to open the door to allowing corporations to donate directly
to candidates and parties. As shocking as such a step would
be to century-old settled practice, it is unclear how big a
difference it would make. Would the world look all that
much different if corporations could contribute $2400 (the
current federal contribution limit on individual donations)
to a candidate? Perhaps, but likely not all that much.239
To the contrary, the story of Section 12(g) may well teach that base limit
donations are the coin of the campaign finance realm. In particular, allowing
corporations to donate up to the base limit to candidates sympathetic to their
cause could have a significant impact on overall donations and on the
appearance of quid pro quo corruption. SecondMarket employees donated
236 See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 149 (2003) ("Since 1907, federal law has
barred such direct contributions to candidates.").
237 id. at 152.
" Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1 18, 133 (2010).
239 Id.
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in total $34,500 to candidates around late 2011 -early 2012.240 Consider the
comparatively vast amount of money, $380,000, SecondMarket itself spent
on lobbying for Section 12(g)'s amendment.241 The corporation clearly had
both the interest in advocating on its own behalf and far greater financial
resources than its individual employees.
Opening corporate coffers to direct campaign contributions thus could
have a significant effect on politics-and all the more so in the absence of
aggregate limits. Moreover, as Professor Jill Fisch has pointed out, the ban
on corporate contributions channels corporate money into "high information
contact activities such as lobbying, testimony, and other direct contacts.
242
Such information is particularly valuable given that legislators often have
less information on the policy impact of legislation than the affected firms.
2 43
In other words, allowing direct corporate contributions may well re-channel
resources into a use that invites large-scale influence while generating no
helpful information for a Congress that needs it.
D. An Alternative to the "Clientelist" Corruption Model
Professor Issacharoff was one of the first legal observers to use the term
"clientelist model" to describe the relationship between politicians and their
donors. As he describes it, clientelism is "a patron-client relationship in
which political support (votes, attendance at rallies, money) is exchanged
for privileged access to public goods. '244  According to Issacharoff, "the
focus of clientelism is not the enrichment of an individual politician but that
individual's continued officeholding on the condition that 'party politicians
distribute public jobs or special favors in exchange for electoral support. "'245
Clientelism, then, is more or less when politicians are "on retainer"-
indebted to special interests for officeholding and expected to deliver
political largess in return. The Section 12(g) story suggests that special
interests may make especially effective use of well-timed and highly
targeted donations. If firms have only occasional legislative concerns, they
24o Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECTION COMM'N,
http://www.fec.gov/finanee/disclosurc/advindsea.shtml (search "Employer/Occupation" field for
"SecondMarket", and limit dates to 2011 2012)
24 SecondMarket Holdings Bills Lobbied, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/
clientbills.php?id=F 12960&year=201 1, and https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientbills.php?id=
F I 2960&year=2012.
242 Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1495,
1566 (2005).243 Id at 1565.
244 Issacharoff, supra note 241 at 127.
245 Id. at 128.
2015]
Journal of Law & Politics
make discrete interventions into politics in order to further their limited
causes, and then subside into relative silence. The clientelist model, in other
words, might only crudely describe the relationship of politics and money
on the ground, failing to take into account discrete and time-bound
relationships.
E. Thoughts on Representativeness and Empirics
Professor Bradley Smith has lamented the dearth of empirical support for
claims of corruption in campaign finance.24 6 He disdains the arguments of
proponents of campaign finance restrictions who "suggest that the influence
of money is shown long before matters are brought to vote: in setting of the
legislative agenda, in deciding which speeches are made, and in the early
drafting stages of legislation. 2 47 As to these assertions, he responds that
"[t]he government interest is not supported by empirical evidence ....
Whatever the particulars of reform proposals, it is increasingly clear that
reformers have overstated the government interest in the anticorruption
rationale. Money's alleged corrupting effects are far from proven. 2 48 The
saga of Section 12(g) supplies evidence that cuts against both the larger and
smaller points made by Professor Smith. For some observers, the Section
12(g) story is one that will bespeak corruption on the face of things. And if
so, they will note that Professor Smith's observations are in tension with the
facts; after all, legislative interventions on Section 12(g) that seemed to
connect up with campaign contributions came at the early drafting stages,
through the introduction of legislation, and the movement of bills out of
committee.
Yet perhaps Section 12(g) presents an extraordinary case. A narrow
special interest was able to get its preferences made into law. While perhaps
troubling, such stories are the exception, rather than the rule. But perhaps
not.
Here is a different perspective. Much of constitutional law-and
campaign finance literature-focuses on hot-button social issues or front-
page controversies in the law. The majority of law, however, is conceived
and crafted behind the scenes. And it is precisely in these instances, when
lawmakers confront issues that not many people care about at all, that
246 See Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86
GEO. L.J. 45, 58 (1997) ("Although the alleged corruption is supported by bits and pieces of anecdotal
evidence and a certain amount of common sense, it has not been supported by systematic studies of voting
records.").
247 d. at 58-59.241 Id. at 63.
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opportunities for quid-pro-quo like behavior are most probable. No robust
studies exist, or perhaps can exist, on this point. But that does not mean that
the story of Section 12(g) is unrepresentative of the legislative process.
F. Disclosure's Limits
The McCutcheon plurality took great comfort in the rules of disclosure.
In particular, it noted that at the time of Buckley "Congress could regard
disclosure of contributors as "only a partial measure," because "information
about campaign contributions was filed at FEC offices and was therefore
virtually inaccessible to the average member of the public."24 9 In contrast to
the Dark Ages of the 1970s, the development of new technology has meant
that "disclosure now offers a particularly effective means of arming the
voting public with information."2 5 The plurality went on to observe that
"[r]eports and databases are available on the FEC's Web site almost
immediately after they are filed, supplemented by private entities such as
OpenSecrets.org and FollowTheMoney.org."
2 5
The plurality has a valid point; indeed, this Article could not easily have
been written without consultation of the very websites to which it refers. Yet
even in a world of proliferating information, there are limits to the power of
disclosure. As Richard Briffault observes, "[t]he extensive disclosure
currently required produces mountains of political finance information that
must be exhaustively mined and analyzed to reveal significant patterns of
giving and spending." '2 52 Private citizens will not sift through these
information mountains on their own, and intermediaries such as the press
offer "very limited" coverage of campaign finance topics.
253
To this Author's knowledge, no investigative journalist or blogger has
reflected on the story of the Section-12(g)-related campaign contributions.
A securities and corporate law scholar by trade, I happened upon it only by
chance while conducting empirical research on another topic. Disclosure
rules may shed useful light on the moneyed interests that seek high-profile
legislation. But there is reason to doubt that these rules will work the same
way for the less exciting, bread-and-butter legislation that lends itself to
corrupting influences, far from the headlines-where no one is looking.
249 McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1460 (2014).
250Id. at 1439.
251 Id. at 1460.
252 Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 288 (2010).
253 Id.
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APPENDIX
(Lobbying expenditures are reported for the quarter after which they
occur.)
On May 24, 2011: Representative Jim Himes (D-CT), a member of the
Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises,
introduced H.R. 1965, requesting a study to improve shareholder registration
thresholds. 254
June 6: SecondMarket employee donates $1000 to Himes.2 55
June 7: SecondMarket employee donates $1000 to Himes 6.2 5
June 13: SecondMarket employee donates $1000 to Schweikert 57 (R-
AZ), member of the Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government
Sponsored Enterprises.25 8
June 14: Schweikert introduces H.R. 2167, the Private Company
Flexibility and Growth Act, which proposes raising the threshold to 1,000
shareholders and excluding accredited investors and employee shares.259
July 20: $20,000 SecondMarket lobbying expenditure. 260
254 H.R. 1965, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
255 See Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECTION COMM'N,
http://www.fc.gov/finance/disclosure/advindsca.shtml (search "Employer/Occupation" field for
"SecondMarket") (listing two SecondMarket employees as contributing $1000 each to Rep. Himes, one on June
6, 2011, and the other on June 7, 2011).256 Id.
257 Id. (listing Rep. Schweikert as receiving a June 13, 2011, donation of $1000 from a SecondMarket
employee).
258 Legislative Proposals to Facilitate Small Business Capital Formation and Job Creation: Hearing
Before the H. Subcomm. on Gov't Sponsored Entities of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 11
(2011) (listing Rep. Schweikert as a subcommittee member).
259 Private Company Flexibility and Growth Act, H.R. 2167, 112th Cong. (2011) (introduced June
14,2011).
260 SecondMarket Holdings, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://soprweb.senate.gov/indcx.cfm?cvent=
getFilingDetails&filinglD=3698EEAE-8C4C-4C3F-A51 E-AE20F549DDE9&filingTypclD=60 (last
visited Mar. 15, 2014) (linking to a July 20, 2011 lobbying report in amount of $20,000 related to the
JOBS Act).
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July 26: Three SecondMarket employees each donate $1000 to
Schweikert.
26 1
July 27: SecondMarket employee donates $1000 to Schweikert. 262
August 29: SecondMarket employee donates $1000 to Schweikert.2 63
September 21: Barry Silbert testifies to Committee on Financial
Services.
2 64
October 17: SecondMarket employee donates $1000 to Mark Warner (D-
VA).265
October 20: SecondMarket employee donates $1000 to Mark Warner.
266
October: $60,000 SecondMarket lobbying expenditure. 267
October 24: SecondMarket employee donates $500 to Gregory Meeks.
261
261 See Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECTION COMM'N,
http://www.fec.gov/financc/disclosurc/advindsca.shtml (search "Employer/Occupation" field for
"SccondMarket") (listing Rep. Schweikert as receiving two $1000 donations from two SccondMarkct
employes on July 26, 2011).
262 Id. (listing Rep. Schweikert as receiving a $1000 donation from a SecondMarket employee on
July 27, 2011).
263 Id. (listing Rep. Schweikert as receiving a $1000 donation from a SecondMarket employee on
Aug. 29, 2011).
264 Legislative Proposals to Facilitate Small Business Capital Formation and Job Creation: Hearing
Before the H. Subcomm. on Gov 't Sponsored Entities of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 35,
48 (2011) (statement of Barry Silbert, Founder & Chief. Executive Officer, SecondMarket, Inc.).
265 See Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECTION COMM'N,
http://www.fec.gov/financedisclosureadvindsea.shtml (search "Employer/Occupation" field for
"SecondMarket") (listing a SecondMarket employee's donation of $1000 each to Sen. Warner on Oct. 17,
2011).
6 ld. (listing a SecondMarket employee's donation of$1000 each to Sen. Warner on Oct. 20, 2011).
267 SecondMarketHoldings, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://soprweb.scnate.gov/index.cfm?cvent=
getFilingDetails&filinglD=CCFI D71C-F3BF-485A-8696-0EB2C58B5877&filingTypelD=69 (last
visited Mar. 15, 2014) (linking to an Oct. 20, 2011 lobbying report in amount of $60,000 related to the
JOBS Act).
261 See Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECTION COMM'N,
http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/advindsea.shtml (search "Employer/Occupation" field for
"SecondMarket") (listing Rep. Meeks as receiving a $500 donation from a SecondMarket employee on Oct.
24,2011).
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October 25: Schweikert joins as co-sponsor of H.R. 1965.269
October 26: H.R. 1965 reported by committee. 27°
H.R. 2167 reported by committee. 271
November 2: H.R. 1965 passes the House (never passed by Senate). 27 2
November 8: Sen. Pat Toomey (R-PA) introduces the S. 1824 Private
Company Flexibility and Growth Act. 273  Mark Warner is a co-sponsor. 274
The bill proposes raising the shareholder threshold to 2,000 persons and not
counting employees who receive the stock as stock options. Goes to
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Dies in committee. 275
Tim Johnson (D-SD) chair, Schumer on committee. 276
November 14: Five SecondMarket employees donate a total of $13,000
to Sen. Schumer (D-NY). 277
Dec. 1: Sen. Schumer introduces S. 1933 Reopening American Capital
Markets to Emerging Growth Companies Act of 2011. 278
269 Bill Summary & Status Congress (2011-2012) H.R. 1965 Cosponsors, THE LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS THOMAS, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.uscongress/legislation. l12hrl 965 (last visited Mar. 16, 2014)
(showing Rep. Schweikert joining as a cosponsor on Oct. 25, 2011).270 Id. (showing a report to the House on Oct. 26, 2011).
27 H.R. REP. NO. 112-327, at 3 (2011).
272 Bill Summary & Status Congress (2011-2012) H.R. 1965 Cosponsors, THE LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS THOMAS, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.uscongrcss/legislation. l12hr1965 (last visited Mar. 16, 2014)
(showing the passage of 1965 in the House).
273 Private Company Flexibility and Growth Act, S. 1824, 112th Cong. (2011).
274 Id. (showing Sen. Warner as a cosponsor).
275 See Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors-Part I:
Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. (2011) (debating S. 1824);
S. 1824 (112'h): Private Company Flexibility and Growth Act, GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s1824 (last visited Mar. 10, 2014) (noting S. 1824 died in
Congress).
276 Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors-Part I.- Hearing
Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 11 (2011) (listing committee
members).
277 See Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECTION COMM'N,
http://www.fec.gov/financc/disclosurc/advindsca.shtm (search "Employer/Occupation" field for
"SccondMarket") (listing five SccondMarkct employees' donations on Nov. 14, 2011, to Impact, totaling
$13,000); Impact, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensccrets.org/pacslookup2.php?strlD=C00348607
(last visited Mar. 11, 2014) (affiliating Impact with Sen. Schumer).
278 Reopening American Capital Markets to Emerging Growth Companies Act of 2011, S. 1933,
112th Cong. (2011).
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Senate hearing: Wawa's Christopher Gheysens testifies; Toomey
questions Cross. 27 9
December 5: Kay Bailey Hutchinson introduces S. 1941. The threshold
is left at 500 if not a bank or bank holding company.
280
December 8: Rep. Mark Fincher introduces H.R. 3606: Jumpstart our
Business Startups.28 ' No mention of 2000 or 500.282
December 30: SecondMarket employee donates $1000 to Senator Shelby
via Defend America PAC.
283
January 20, 2012: $10,000 Wawa lobbying expenditure; 28 4 $60,000
SecondMarket lobbying expenditure.
285
February 15: H.R. 3606 reported by committee.
2 8 6
March 1: H.R. 3606 has no mention of 2000.287
279 Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors-Part 1: Hearing
Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 29 (2011) (statement of Christopher
T. Gheysens, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial & Administrative Officer, Wawa Inc.).
2. See Bill Summary & Status 112th Congress (2011-2012) S. 1941 All Information, THE LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS THOMAS, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.uscongress/lcgislation. 112sl 941 (last visited Mar. 16, 2014)
(summarizing the bill).
2I Reopening American Capital Markets to Emerging Growth Companies Act of 2011, H.R. 3606
112th Cong. (2012).
282 See generally H.R. Rep. No. 112-406 (2012) (containing no mention of a 2000 shareholder
threshold).
23 Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECTION COMM'N,
http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/advindsca.shtml (search "Employer/Occupation" field for
"SecondMarket") (showing a SecondMarket employee contributed $1000 to Defend America PAC on Dec.
30, 2011); Defend America PAC, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensccrets.org/pacs/
lookup2.php?strlD=C00325993&cycle=2014 (last visited Mar. 15, 2014) (showing Sen. Shelby's affiliation
with Defend America PAC).
284 Wawa, Inc., OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensccrets.org/iobby/client reports.php?
id=D000029767&ycar-2011 (last visited Mar. 15, 2014) (linking to a Jan. 20, 2012 lobbying report in
the amount of$10,000).
215 SecondMarket Holdings, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://soprweb.senate.gov/index.cfm?event=
getFilingDetails&filingiD=F6798A91 -EAED-4848-AD38-80525F238466&filingTypclD=51 (last
visited Mar. 15, 2014) (linking to an Apr.. 20, 2012 lobbying report in amount of $60,000 related to the
JOBS Act).286 H.R. REP. No. 112-409 (2012).
27 See generally H.R. REP. No. 112-406 (2012) (containing no mention of a 2000 shareholder
threshold).
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March 8: Miller of NC amendment to add 2000 persons or 500 persons
who are not accredited.
March 8: Passed House with 2000.28
March 9: SecondMarket employee donates $1000 to Sen. Toomey. 89
March 13: Placed on Senate calendar.2 90
March 15: SecondMarket employee donates $1000 to Sen. Toomey 291
March 20: Three SecondMarket employees donate a total of $4500 to
Sen. Tim Johnson,292 chair of the Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs. 29
3
March 22: Passed Senate with changes. 294
March 27: House agreed to changes. 295
288 Bill Summary & Status 112th Congress (2011-2012) H.R. 3606 All Information, THE LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS THOMAS, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.uscongress/legislation.l12hr3606 (last visited Mar. 16, 2014)
(showing the bill's passage in the House on Mar. 8, 2012).
289 Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECTION COMM'N,
http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/advindsea.shtml (search "Employer/Occupation" field for
"SecondMarket") (listing one SecondMarkct employee as contributing $1000 to Sen. Toomey on Mar. 9,
2012).
29 Bill Summary & Status 112 h Congress (2011-2012) H.R. 3606 All Information, THE LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS THOMAS, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.uscongrcss/legislation.112hr3606 (last visited Mar. 16, 2014)
(showing the bill was placed on the Senate calendar).
291 Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECTION COMM'N,
http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/advindsca.shtml (search "Employer/Occupation" field for
"SecondMarket') (listing one SecondMarket employee as contributing $1000 to Sen. Toomey on Mar. 15,
2012).
29 Id. (listing three SecondMarket employees as contributing $1000, $1000, and $2500 to Sen.
Johnson on Mar.20, 2012).
293 Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors-Part 1: Hearing
Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 11 (2011) (listing Sen. Johnson
among the committee members).
294 Bill Summary & Status 112th Congress (2011-2012) H.R. 3606 All Information, THE LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS THOMAS, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.uscongress/legislation.l 12hr3606 (last visited Mar. 16, 2014)
(showing the bill passed the Senate with Amendments on Mar. 22, 2012).
295 id.
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March 27: Three SecondMarket employees donate a total of $5000 to
Shelley Berkley. 296
March 27: SecondMarket employee donates $500 to Rep. Himes. 297
April 5: President Obama signs the JOBS Act.2 98
April 20: $60,000 SecondMarket lobbying expenditure; 299 $30,000
Wawa lobbying expenditure. 30 0
June 27: Six Wawa employees donate a total of $10,000 to Friends of Pat
Toomey. 30
1
296 Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECTION COMM'N,
http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/advindsea.shtml (search "Employer/Occupation" field for
"SecondMarket") (listing two SceondMarket employees as contributing $1250 each and one employee
contributing $2500 to Sen. Berkley on Mar. 27, 2012).
117 Id. (listing a SecondMarket employee as contributing $500 to Rep. Himes).
298 Bill Summary & Status 1 12th Congress (2011-2012) H.R. 3606 All Information, THE LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdqucry/z?d12:HR03606: @@@L&summ2=m&
(last visited Mar. 16, 2014) (showing the President signed the bill on Apr. 5, 2012).
299 SecondMarketHoldings, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://soprweb.senate.gov/index.cfm?evcnt=
getFilingDetails&filinglD=F6798A91 -EAED-4848-AD38-80525F238466&filingTypclD=51 (last
visited Mar. 15, 2014) (linking to an Apr. 20, 2012 lobbying report in amount of $60,000 related to the
JOBS Act).
300 Wawa, Inc., OPENSECRETS.ORG (last visited Mar. 15, 2014),
http://soprweb.senate.gov/index.cfm?evcnt=getFilingDetails&filinglD=CD5AFB27-5357-4C49-
ABBB-C98B8FD621AF&filingTypelD=51 (last visited Mar. 15, 2014) (linking to an Apr. 20, 2012
lobbying report in the amount of $30,000).
'' Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECTION COMM'N,
http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/advindsea.shtml (search "Employer/Occupation" field for "Wawa")
(showing five Wawa employees contributed $1000 to Friends of Pat Toomey on June 27, 2012 and one
Wawa employee made two $2500 contributions on June 27, 2012).
3o I d. (search "Individual Name" field "Compitello, William")(showing a single donation to Friends
of Pat Toomey); Id (search "Individual Name" field "Eckhardt, Michael") (showing a single donation to
Friends of Pat Toomey); Id (search "Individual Name" field "Gheysens, Chris") (showing the June 27,
2012 contribution and one other to Wawa Political Action Committee); Id. (search "Individual Name"
field "Pulos, Catherine") (showing the June 27, 2012 contribution and one other to Wawa Political Action
Committee); Id. (search "Individual Name" field "Schroeder, Nathaniel"); Id. (search "Individual Name"
field "Stoeckel, Howard") (showing no other campaign contributions).

